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Climate scientists have identified global warming as the 
most important environmental issue of our time, but it 
has taken over 20 years for the problem to penetrate the 
public discourse in even the most superficial manner. 
While some nations have done better than others, 
no nation has adequately reduced emissions and no 
nation has a base of public citizens that are sufficiently 
socially and politically engaged in response to climate 
change. This paper summarizes international and 
national differences in levels of knowledge and concern 
regarding climate change, and the existing explanations 
for the worldwide failure of public response to climate 
change, drawing from psychology, social psychology 
and sociology. On the whole, the widely presumed links 
between public access to information on climate change 
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and levels of concern and action are not supported. The 
paper’s key findings emphasize the presence of negative 
emotions in conjunction with global warming (fear, 
guilt, and helplessness), and the process of emotion 
management and cultural norms in the construction of 
a social reality in which climate change is held at arms 
length. Barriers in responding to climate change are 
placed into three broad categories: 1) psychological/
conceptual, 2) social and cultural, and 3) structural 
(political economy). The author provides policy 
considerations and summarizes the policy implications 
of both psychological and conceptual barriers, and social 
and cultural barriers. An annotated bibliography is 
included. Cognitive and Behavioral Challenges in Responding to Climate Change 
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NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Climate scientists have identified global warming as the most important environmental issue of 
our time, but it has taken over 20 years for the problem to penetrate the public discourse in even 
the most superficial manner. While some nations have done better than others, no nation has 
adequately reduced emissions. No nation has a base of public citizens that are sufficiently 
socially and politically engaged on the problem. Sociologists have identified a widespread lack 
of public reaction to scientific information regarding climate change. By “reaction” sociologists 
include the widest possible range of reactions from planning by federal and state officials, to 
social movement activity, to individual behavioral change, or even acknowledging the 
information by letting it cross our minds or talking about it with friends and family. Now the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change calls for reductions of 50 to 80% in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050 (IPCC 2007). Although public concern is beginning to arise, climate change 
has been neither a policy issue, nor publicly salient in the broadest sense. Why is this the case? 
And more importantly, given the seriousness of future climate scenarios, is there anything that 
can be done? 
We Are All Affected, but Not Equally 
On the one hand, scholars have suggested that climate change – as a profoundly serious and 
global environmental problem – offers a new opportunity for global solidarity and unity. After 
all, climate change is one of the few issues that is affecting or will affect everyone on the planet. 
Yet, although climate change will eventually impact each of us, differences in infrastructure and 
locality profoundly affect vulnerability (IPCC 2007).  Poor people in some parts of the world 
already bear the brunt of the burden, while wealthy people in industrialized nations still feel 
climate change is abstract and distant from their daily lives (Norgaard, 2006, Nisbet and Myers 
2007, Brechin 2008). We know that global warming will precipitate the most extensive and 
violent impacts to date against the poor and people of color of the globe.  There are also regional 
differences in who feels the most severe impacts, with people living in the arctic, on islands, and 
in low lying coastal regions on the front lines (IPCC 2007, Baer and Singer 2009, Roberts and 
Parks 2007, Congressional Black Caucus Foundation 2004, Redclift and Sage 1998). For this  
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reason, in addition to being a major environmental problem, global climate change is a highly 
significant issue of global environmental justice (Athanasiou and Baer 2002, Baer et al. 2000, 
Agarwal and Narain 1991, Donohoe 2003, Roberts 2001, Roberts and Parks, 2007, Pettit 2004).  
Furthermore, industrialized nations of the Northern hemisphere emit greenhouse gases 
disproportionately to the global airshed, while lack of resources and infrastructure place poor 
nations most at risk (Watson et al. 1998). While the phrase environmental justice was at first 
applied mostly to domestic situations (e.g. Bullard 1990), there is increasing attention to a global 
environmental justice approach that identifies links between human rights and environmental 
degradation (Anthanasiou and Baer 2002, Roberts and Parks 2007). 
  Climate change is an issue of global environmental justice on at least four dimensions: 1) 
wealthy industrialized countries of the Northern hemisphere contribute disproportionately to the 
pollution of the common global airshed (IPCC 2007); 2) low lying geography and weaker 
infrastructure mean that consequences of global climate change will be worse in the poorer 
nations of the Southern hemisphere (Watson, et al.. 1998, Roberts 2001, Roberts and Parks 2007, 
Guha 2002); 3) climate treaty negotiations have favored industrialized nations in terms of both 
outcome and process (Baer et al. 2002, CSE 1998); and 4) intergenerational equity: those alive 
today are negatively altering the earth’s atmosphere and climate, reducing its capacity to sustain 
life for generations to come (Athanasiou and Baer 2002, Agarwal and Narain 1991, Howarth and 
Norgaard 1990). 
  The fact that not everyone is equally impacted by climate change will be discussed below 
in the context of behavioral and cognitive challenges that are posed in responding to it. 
Differential impacts are also important here in the context of patterns of response since part of 
differences in response are presumably due to differences in the directness of perceived effects. 
Indigenous communities in the Arctic and urban dwellers in wealthy industrialized nations form 
two opposite poles of this spectrum. 
  Indigenous communities in the Arctic are an example of a group on the front lines of 
experiencing direct impacts from climate change (IPCC 2007, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
2004, Trainor, et al. 2008). This is so because of their location in the Arctic where changes 
happen faster, because cultural ties to land have not yet been severed such that people retain 
subsistence activities, because culture and social structure are organized around conditions of the  
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natural world, and because many communities have fewer economic resources to respond. For 
these reasons, northern indigenous people face a very different set of material as well as 
psychological experiences in the face of climate change. Yet while there are fewer mechanisms 
pointing towards denial as a psychological barrier to action, barriers in the form of social, 
political and economic capital are significant. 
  Developed Nations- Public Apathy? Public Ignorance?  Despite the extreme seriousness 
of this global environmental problem, the pattern of meager public response in the way of social 
movement activity, behavioral changes or public pressure on governments is visible in all 
Western nations (Brechin 2003, Dunlap 1998). Countries of the “North” where citizens are well 
educated and have economic resources to make behavioral changes are not doing so as might be 
expected. Especially for urban dwellers in the rich and powerful Northern countries 
environmental concerns such as climate change are seen by many as “no more than background 
noise” (Brechin 2008). Instead there is a pronounced ability to “distance oneself from 
information” (Norgaard 2006a and 2006b, Stoll-Kleeman et al. 2001, Kellstedt et al. 2008). 
 
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES:  GLOBAL 
CONCERN AND AWARENESS REGARDING CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was founded in 1988 and has produced widely 
publicized reports on the state of climate science since the first assessment was released in 1990. 
As we will see in the media analysis below, climate change has been visible in news media 
around the world for some time. What do people around the world understand of climate 
science? What level of concern do they express about these findings? Here I will review existing 
polling data on levels of citizen knowledge and concern of climate science. We also pose 
questions and examine some evidence regarding the relationship between information and 
concern, and information and action. These themes will be expanded upon in the section on 
existing explanations for lack of response. In general, existing work on knowledge and concern 
regarding climate change indicates that:  
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$  A lack of citizen understanding regarding the basics of climate science is 
an almost universal finding worldwide even though knowledge has 
increased over time. Especially notable is confusion between causes of 
climate change and ozone depletion, and confusion between weather and 
climate. 
$  Americans know far less about climate change than their counterparts in 
the developed world 
$  Accurate and complete understanding of information is not a pre-requisite 
for concern.  
$  Concern is widespread around the world, but it may also be inversely 
correlated with the wealth and carbon footprint of a nation. 
$   In some studies, more informed respondents reported less concern or sense 
of responsibility towards climate change. 
$   People stop paying attention to global climate change when they realize 
that there is no easy solution for it. Many people judge as serious only 
those problems for which they think action can be taken. 
 
Information and Understanding 
We begin first with what citizens around the world understand about climate change. The earliest 
major academic studies were carried out by Bostrom and co-authors, (1994), Bord, Fisher and 
O’Connor (1998), and Dunlap (1998). There have also been a series of public opinion polls in 
the U.S. We include these via work by Nisbet and Myers in 2007 and Brewer (2005) who 
publish systematic reviews of polling data on climate change in the U.S. which extend back into 
the 1980s. Psychologist Paul Slovic and interdisciplinary scholar Anthony Lessierowitz have 
also conducted recent work. All studies are in agreement in finding widespread 
misunderstanding regarding climate science. 
  In 1994 Bostrom and co-authors use a “mental model” approach to assess American 
understanding of climate science. They report “widespread misinformation regarding climate 
change in the general public, including confusion between ozone hole and global climate change 
and between weather and climate.”  The authors also report confusion regarding causes of 
climate change: “automobile use, heat and emissions from industrial processes, aerosol spray 
cans, and pollution in general were frequently perceived as primary causes of global warming.”  
 Two  comparative  international studies were published in 1998. Bord, Fisher and 
O’Connor (1998) review international survey data on public knowledge, concern, perceived risk 
and “willingness to pay” regarding global warming. While the authors find “solid awareness of  
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and support for general environmental goals” and some measure of awareness and concern 
regarding global warming, they also find a widespread poor understanding of climate change in 
the public around the world. Similarly, Dunlap (1998) reports results from a 1992 Gallup survey 
conducted in Canada, the US, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, and Russia on public perceptions of 
global warming.  Most respondents did not understand climate science well. In particular the 
study found, as have others, confusion between climate change and ozone depletion. Dunlap 
finds the public to be “poorly informed about global warming” (1998, 498).  
  More recently, work by Nisbet and Myers (2007) and Brechin (2003) provide updated 
coverage of the extent of public knowledge of climate science. Brechin (2003) compiles public 
opinion surveys on public understanding of climate change from 15 nations between 1991 and 
2001. He finds that even as scientific consensus on climate science increases, knowledge 
regarding causes of climate change by the public is minimal. Brechin does find increased public 
understanding regarding the causes of climate change over the decade from 1991 to 2001, 
however citizens in all nations studied remain largely uniformed. In the 2001 survey, citizens of 
Mexico knew the most about the causes of climate change, but even here only one-quarter of 
respondents correctly identified burning fossil fuels as the primary cause of global warming. 
Americans, who were tied with the citizens of Brazil at 15%, were in the middle of the pack. 
Brechin laments the low level of awareness in the U.S.:  
“In the most recent international study on knowledge about global warming, the 
citizens of Mexico led all fifteen countries surveyed in 2001 with just twenty-six 
percent of the survey respondents correctly identifying that burning fossil fuels 
was the primary cause of global warming. The citizens of the US, among the most 
educated in the world, were somewhere in the middle of the pack, tied with the 
citizens of Brazil at fifteen percent. Even the Cubans, at seventeen percent, were 
slightly more informed than the American public (2003, 125)”  
  In 2007 Nisbet and Myers published a systematic review of trends in US public opinion 
regarding global warming over the past 20 years. They summarize public opinion across several 
key dimensions including (a) public awareness of the issue of global warming; (b) public 
understanding of the causes of global warming and the specifics of the policy debate; (c) public 
perceptions of the certainty of the science and the level of agreement among experts; (d) public  
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concern about the impacts of global warming; (e) public support for policy action in light of 
potential economic costs; and (f) public support for the Kyoto climate treaty. This work provides 
a useful summary of a series of sometimes contradictory studies.  
  Overall they report that, “Twenty years after scientists and journalists first alerted the 
public to the potential problem of global warming, few Americans are confident that they fully 
grasp the complexities of the issue, and on questions measuring actual knowledge about either 
the science or the policy involved, the public scores very low. As of 1992, only 11 percent of the 
public answered that they understood the issue of global warming “very well,” and across Gallup 
surveys taken each year between 2001 and 2005, this figure ranged between only 15 percent and 
18 percent of respondents, increasing to 22 percent of respondents in 2007” (ibid). 
Concern 
A second important category of public opinion polls on climate change are questions about the 
level of concern held by citizens. Here again we review a combination of studies focused solely 
on the US and those which provide international comparison. The earliest high profile cross 
national work was conducted by Riley Dunlap in 1998 as part of the Gallup Health of the Planet 
survey (mentioned above for measures of knowledge). Dunlap’s survey contains results also on 
concern (again, these data are from six nations: Canada, the US, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, and 
Russia). Most respondents interviewed saw global warming as a problem, although it was not 
generally ranked as seriously as ozone depletion or rain forest destruction. Dunlap’s work points 
to two important issues. First, as predicted by the concept of a risk society, his results show that 
perceptions of global warming do not vary consistently across differing social strata within 
nations. Dunlap notes that: “Perhaps more directly supportive of the risk society hypothesis is 
that neither ratings of global warming nor of all seven problems combined correlate significantly 
and consistently with age, sex, education or residence across the six nations, suggesting that 
Beck (1992) is justified in arguing that concern over global mega-hazards is broadly diffused 
throughout society” (479). Secondly, despite limitations in knowledge, citizens in all nations 
except Russia believed that climate change would have consequences in their lifetimes. Thus he 
notes that detailed public understanding is not actually necessary for policy response.  
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  Bord, Fisher and O’Connor (1998) also review international survey data on public 
knowledge, concern, perceived risk and willingness to pay regarding global warming. They 
found that at that time concern was highest in Canada, most of Europe and South America. Yet 
they report that, “although the public expresses considerable perceived threat from global 
warming, the threat is less so than for most other issues surveyed” (77). The other issues 
addressed in their study were air pollution, water pollution, loss of rainforest, loss of ozone, loss 
of species and contaminated soil.  In conclusion, they find that although global warming is an 
issue of concern worldwide, it is not a ‘front-burner’ issue. They also find a “limited willingness 
to sacrifice” in response to climate change. The authors note that “Our own data support but go 
beyond earlier data by implying that global warming is not a salient issue, and that people across 
the globe will support global climate change initiatives that do not levy unusual hardships; but 
they cannot be expected to voluntarily alter their lifestyles” (75). Exactly why climate change is 
such a back burner issue may be answered in part by ethnographic work on denial to be 
discussed below. At least in wealthy nations few people see the connections between climate 
change and daily life (Norgaard and Rudy 2008). 
  Two more recent studies on the United States are especially important. Data on public 
concern is somewhat conflicting and varies by survey as well as how the questions are asked. 
Nisbet and Myers’ (2007) review of US trends includes questions on concern. This work again 
provides a useful meta analysis of what is happening in the United States. Nisbet and Myers’ 
review indicates that concern regarding climate change has increased since the mid-1990s in the 
United States.  They summarize data showing that the proportion of Americans who say that 
global warming is either personally “extremely important” or “very important” increased from 
27 percent in 1997 to 52 percent in 2007. When asked about climate change alongside other 
environmental issues however, it ranks lower than other problems (authors here cite data from 
Carroll 2006, 2007; Saad 2006). Nisbet and Myers also note that Americans “discount” the threat 
of climate change, perhaps because it is an environmental problem with consequences that are 
perceived to be far off in the future (see e.g. Moser and Dilling 2004). They provide data from 
poll trends that back up these conclusions.  
Gallup asked respondents to evaluate the timeline for global warming effects. 
Queried in 1997, and then each year between 2001 and 2005, only a bare majority  
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of Americans answered that the effects of global warming had already begun, 
with this figure rising to 60 percent in 2007. Other survey trends show that only 
about a third of the public believe that global warming will pose a threat within 
their lifetime. 
A recent comparative study on concern takes a different angle. Hanno Sandvik (2008) published 
some very interesting findings based on a cross national sample of data on public concern for 
climate change from 46 countries. Sandvik builds on work by Norgaard and others to assert that 
public awareness and concern regarding climate change is not a function of scientific 
information alone, but psychological and sociological factors as well. Sandvik reports a negative 
association between concern and national wealth and carbon dioxide emissions, and a 
“marginally significant” tendency that nations’ per capita carbon dioxide emissions are 
negatively correlated to public concern. Sandvik writes, “these findings suggest that the 
willingness of a nation to contribute to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions decreases with its 
share of these emissions” (333). He concludes that such a relationship apparent is “in accordance 
with psychological findings, but poses a problem for political decision-makers.” Although 
Sandvik is the first to explicitly test a relationship between wealth and concern, his findings are 
in accordance with earlier work across spatial scales from the individual to the nation-state. For 
example, Zahran et al.. (2006) found that citizens residing in U.S. states with higher emissions of 
climate gasses are somewhat less likely to support climate change policies. O’Connor et al.. 
(2002) found that higher income negatively affected participants’ wiliness to take some 
voluntary actions such as driving less (this finding did not hold across all actions). Similarly, an 
inverse relationship between wealth and concern is also reported in Dunlap’s 1998 cross national 
research, but with a smaller sample of nations. Although he does not give this relationship much 
discussion, Dunlap notes that “Quite importantly, despite the lower levels of understanding 
among citizens of the poorer nations in our study (Portugal, Brazil and Mexico), residents of 
these nations typically express more concern over global warming than do those in the more 
affluent nations (Canada, U.S., Russia)” (488). Furthermore, there are no examples of the reverse 
relationship, in which higher income is positively correlated with concern or support of climate 
protection policy. Especially because these findings are counter-intuitive to many, we will return 
to these findings in our section on policy considerations.   
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  A second important set of studies on the United States using Gallup data shows an 
emerging partisan split between Democrats and Republicans (Dunlap, Xiao and McCright, 2001, 
and Dunlap and McCright 2008). On the one hand, this study provides updated data on a series 
of important questions including whether people believe that global warming is occurring, and 
whether they believe it will pose a serious threat within their lifetimes. The authors note that, 
“The percentage of Americans viewing global warming as a serious threat to themselves or their 
way of life during their lifetimes has moderately increased, from 25 percent in 1997 to 40 
percent in 2008.” Asked in the 2008 Gallup poll when the effects of global warming will begin to 
happen, 61 percent of respondents said, “they have already begun.” The authors note that while 
this may only be a moderate increase from 1997, when only 48 percent gave this response, it still 
represents a significant shift from a large minority to a solid majority of the American public. 
  The main focus however is on a particularly interesting phenomenon in the United States, 
that of a prominent partisan split between Democrat and Republican perceptions on climate 
change. This split is important for two reasons. First, historically support for environmental 
protection in the United States has been relatively nonpartisan. After all it was Nixon who in 
1970 declared the 1970s as the “environmental decade” and proceeded to pass the strongest 
environmental legislation the world had seen. Since 1994, however, a divide has been noticeable, 
especially among members of Congress. Data from the League of Conservation Voters indicate a 
growing divide in environmental voting records in both the House and Senate.  And, “nowhere is 
the partisan gap on environmental issues more apparent than on climate change.” Members of 
Congress tend to be more ideologically polarized than the general public. Now a very large gap 
exists between self-identified Republicans and Democrats in terms of perceptions of global 
warming. Dulap and McCright further write that, “Gallup Poll results on global warming 
spanning a decade, including results from Gallup’s 2008 Environment Poll conducted on March 
12 suggest that this skepticism among Republican and conservative elites has led rank-and-file 
Republicans in the electorate to follow suit.” Thus, while overall in the Untied States citizen 
perceptions on the seriousness of climate change have increased, “What these overall trends 
generally mask, however, are highly divergent trends among Republicans and Democrats.” 
Specifically,  
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while more than three-fourths of Democrats (76 percent) believe global warming 
is already happening, only 42 percent of Republicans share that view in 2008. The 
resulting 34 percent gap stands in stark contrast to 1997, when nearly identical 
percentages of Republicans and Democrats (48 and 52 percent, respectively) 
indicated that global warming was already happening. Thus, despite all the 
attention given to global warming in the media, including coverage of IPCC 
reports, Republicans have become somewhat less likely over the past decade to 
believe that global warming is already occurring (from 48 to 42 percent), while 
Democrats have become much more likely to hold this belief (from 52 to 76 
percent). 
Not only is this split between Democrats and Republicans notable as a newer phenomenon, such 
a split is more significant on climate change than for other environmental issues.  Finally, such a 
split is important because, as Dunlap and McCright highlight, it is a symptom of a new and now 
explicit link between party affiliation and the questioning of climate science (see also work by 
Jacques 2008).  
Is There a Link between Information and Concern? 
Whether and under what circumstances information leads to concern, action, (or to reports of 
action) are ongoing questions, and ones to which we will return throughout this document. A few 
summary comments of the above literature are provided here. Although the basic premise of an 
enlightened, democratic and modern society is that information (especially scientific 
information) will lead to concern and response on the part of the public and public institutions, 
the case of climate change poses a challenge to this paradigm (Jacques et al., 2008, Jacques 
2008, Norgaard 2006). On the one hand, such results are deeply troubling to our enlightenment 
sensibilities in which we presume that knowledge will lead to rational action. Yet they need not 
have wholly negative policy implications. As mentioned above, Dunlap notes the positive 
perspective that despite limitations in knowledge, citizens in all nations except Russia believed 
that climate change would have consequences in their lifetimes (1998). Certainly we would do 
well to better understand the policy and political significance of such dynamics. Thus, as will be 
discussed in the policy section below, Dunlap makes the important observation that detailed  
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public understanding of highly complex issues such as global warming may be neither feasible 
nor necessary for effective policy making.   
  Paradoxically, as evidence for climate change pours in and scientific consensus increases, 
interest in the issue throughout many Western nations declined during the 1990s and into the 
early 2000s (e.g. Hellevik, 2002, Immerwahr, 1999, Saad 2002). For example, Gallup polls for 
the United States show that the percentage of people who, “personally worry a great deal about 
global warming” dropped from 35% in 1989 to 28% in 2001, while the percentage who worry 
“not at all” rose from 12 to 17% during the same time period (Saad 2002).  Even more 
dramatically, biannual national level survey research in Norway finds a significant and steady 
downward trend in public interest and concern about global warming, with the percentage of 
respondents who replied that they were “very much worried” declining steadily from 40% in 
1989 to less than 10% in 2001 (Hellevik 2002, Barstad and Hellevik 2004). See also work by 
Kellsted et al. 2008 discussed below.  
Is There a Link between Information and Action? 
On the one hand, if the public lacks complete information, neither concern nor action is likely. 
For example, Bostrom, et al. 1994 argue that this general public misunderstanding of climate 
science is part of the widespread failure of response: “When asked what could be done, 
respondents tended to focus on general pollution control rather than reductions of carbon dioxide 
emissions or energy consumption.” On the other hand, the research discussed above reports 
somewhat conflicting patterns regarding information as a pre-requisite for action. 
  For example, in their survey of 1,218 Americans, Bord, O'Connor and Fischer 2000 did 
find that the key determinant of stated behavioral intentions to address global warming is a 
correct understanding of the causes of global warming. They write that “Knowing what causes 
climate change, and what does not, is the most powerful predictor of both stated intentions to 
take voluntary actions and to vote on hypothetical referenda to enact new government policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” Similarly, the authors found that those who did not know the 
causes of climate change were less likely to say they would take action or support for 
government policies. Thus they conclude that, “General pro-environmental beliefs and 
perceptions that global warming poses serious threats to society also help to explain behavioral  
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intentions. . . Translating public concern for global warming into effective action requires real 
knowledge. General environmental concern or concern for the negative effects of air pollution 
appear not to motivate people to support programs designed to control global warming.” Stated 
intentions are of course very different from engaging in actual behaviors.  
  The work of O’Connor et al. 2002 uses a heuristic model approach to compare cognitive, 
economic, and partisan explanations for who supports reductions in climate emissions. The 
authors conclude that so called “cognitive” explanations of support for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions are more powerful than economic or partisan heuristic ones. “People want to reduce 
emissions if they understand the causes of climate change, if they perceive substantial risks from 
climate change if average surface temperatures increase, and if they think climate change 
mitigation policies will not cost them their jobs.” The authors find that people who can both 
accurately identify causes of climate change and who expect negative future climate scenarios 
are the most likely to support both government and voluntary actions. “Economic circumstances 
and anxieties are not important predictors, but the belief that environmental protection efforts do 
not threaten jobs for people like the respondent, limit personal freedoms, and hurt the economy is 
a strong predictor” (ibid). From another angle, Stanford social psychologist Jon Krosnic has 
studied various aspects of the relationship between efficacy, concern and willingness to take 
action. In recent work on public perceptions of climate change, Krosnic et al. 2006 observe that 
people stopped paying attention to global climate change when they realize that there is no easy 
solution for it. Instead they note that many people judge as serious only those problems for 
which they think action can be taken.  
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR LACK OF RESPONSE 
 
A wide range of scholars from multiple disciplinary backgrounds have addressed the question of 
why the public has largely failed to respond to climate change. The dominant disciplines to 
consider are psychology, social-psychology and sociology. Some scholars working on this topic 
approach non-response from highly theoretical orientations. Others conduct public opinion 
surveys take it at face value, but their work still offers insight into the dynamics of non-response.  
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Throughout this section we will consider examples from two case studies, one in Norway, the 
other in the United States. 
  In order to navigate these very different disciplinary perspectives on what is going on it is 
important to lay out some of the assumptions, terrain and language of each field. It is also 
important to note how these different theoretical and disciplinary perspectives may fit together 
under some circumstances, as well as how they fail to make sense together in other cases (as 
when basic assumptions about human nature are opposing). 
  Following this preliminary introduction, we will work through a series of explanations by 
theme, simultaneously considering work from psychology, social-psychology, sociology and 
political opinion polls as they apply to each of four broader answers to the question of why there 
is so little public response to climate change. These are: 1) people don’t know enough to realize 
the danger, 2) people don’t care enough to take action, 3) there is hierarchy of needs and climate 
change is not an immediate need, 4) people have trust that the government will fix the problem. 
From this survey of existing explanations, we extract a series of cognitive and behavioral 
limitations faced by the public in responding to climate change. 
  We then move to my own answer to the question of why well educated and relatively 
privileged people have failed to act, which blends psychology and sociology to lay out a 
conception of socially organized denial. Under this framework, information from climate science 
is known in the abstract, but disconnected from, and invisible within political, social or private 
life. Instead, people actually work to avoid acknowledging disturbing information in order to 1) 
avoid emotions of fear, guilt and helplessness, 2) follow cultural norms, and 3) maintain positive 
conceptions of individual and national identity. National identity may be in turn linked to 
subconscious economic self interest since “Citizens of wealthy nations who fail to respond to the 
issue of climate change benefit from their denial in economic terms. They also benefit by 
avoiding the emotional and psychological entanglement and identity conflicts that may arise 
from knowing that one is doing ‘the wrong thing’” (Norgaard 2006b, 366). People described a 
sense of knowing and not knowing about climate change, of having information but not thinking 
about it in their everyday lives. In discussing this model, I incorporate material from psychology, 
social psychology as well as sociology of emotions, sociology of culture and political economy.  
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A Disciplinary Primer: Assumptions and Frameworks from Relevant 
Fields 
Researchers in psychology, social psychology and sociology hold unique research approaches, 
methods, and terminology, and tend to publish in their own set of journals. Psychologists have 
conducted a great deal of work relevant to the perception and cognition of climate science, as 
well as work on the role of affect in shaping cognition. Psychological investigation of perception, 
cognition, identity, emotion, and behavior is often biologically based, and results are 
characterized as more universal phenomena. Although there are a variety of theoretical 
orientations, almost all psychology takes the individual as the unit of analysis. Experimental 
methods are common in many of the studies that will be discussed here. Social psychology 
focuses on the interaction between individuals and groups. As a discipline, social-psychology is 
complicated by the fact that it approaches questions from both the sociological and psychological 
angle. Social psychological work considered here has examined for example the effects of group, 
nation and social location on perceptions of climate change.  
  The field of sociology, although very broad in its scope, is characterized by its attention 
to the tension between individuals and society (known as the micro-marco link). For sociologists, 
questions about individual behavior are situated in a social context, and questions about 
widespread social patterns are in turn understood in the circumstance of individual wants and 
needs. Sociologists have addressed a wide range of questions related to climate change behavior 
including media discourses, the relationship between the state and corporations in structuring 
national climate policies, as well as how cognition and emotion are socially constructed. From a 
social problems perspective, not all potential issues make it onto the public agenda. Even 
problems which are quite serious and affect many individuals do not automatically receive space 
in the public eye.  Rather the one criteria of whether an issue will make it to the level of a 
recognized “social problem” is that the condition can be solved through collective action. From 
this perspective it is taken as given that if no solution is perceived to be possible, people are 
more likely to “resign themselves to their fate.” In some cases psychological explanations for 
behavior can easily be integrated into sociological analysis (as when individual tendencies are 
understood to be modified by social context). In other cases, the sociological emphasis on the 
role of culture and social structure in cognition and perception for example, are counter to  
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psychological explanations which view individuals in isolation. In other words, sociologists are 
more inclined to ask questions about how cognition or perception may differ by social status, 
wealth or other demographic variables, while psychologists often treat these as biologically 
driven and/or subject to more universal laws. 
Four Existing Explanations 
“If people only knew” 
Not surprisingly, given the extensive survey data discussed earlier on the public’s lack of 
knowledge regarding climate change, the dominant theme of research from fields as widespread 
as science and risk communication, environmental sociology and psychology, has emphasized 
the public’s lack of information and knowledge as a barrier to social action. Bostrom and co-
authors write that, “To a significant degree the effectiveness with which society responds to this 
possibility depends on how well it is understood by individual citizens. As voters, citizens must 
decide which policies and politicians to support. As consumers, they must decide whether and 
how to consider environmental effects when making choices such as whether our resources are 
most efficiently deployed by using paper or polystyrene foam cups” (1994, 959). The sense that, 
“if people only knew,” they would act differently: i.e., drive less, “rise up” and put pressure on 
the government is widespread in popular discourse and environmental literature, and also 
underlies work from psychology, social psychology and sociology. Psychologists and social 
psychologists have described flawed cognitive and mental models that limit people’s ability to 
grasp what is going on, while sociologists have documented the manipulation of climate science 
(especially in the United States) and the media’s role in misinforming the public through 
magnifying the perception of uncertainty. Sociologists have also conducted opinion polls 
highlighting the lack of public understanding of climate science and espoused the need for 
greater awareness. Examples of each are reviewed below. 
  The “conceptual challenges” surrounding global warming have been primarily 
understood in terms of limitations of individual psychology (i.e., mental models, confirmation 
bias), or to media framing (see e.g. Bell 1994; Ungar 1992, Boykoff 2004, 2008). Psychologists 
have described the power of “faulty” decision making powers such as “confirmation bias”  
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(Halford and Sheehan, 1991). Bostrom et al. (1994), describe how effective public response is 
limited because “lay mental models of global climate change suffer from several basic 
misconceptions.” (P.968). For example, psychologists Grame Halford and Peter Sheehan write 
that “With better mental models and more appropriate analogies for global change issues, it is 
likely that more people, including more opinion leaders, will make the decision to implement 
some positive coping action of a precautionary nature” (1991, 606). From another angle, “affect” 
is considered by social psychologists to be the positive or negative evaluation of an object, idea, 
or image. Similar to emotions, but not as “full blown”, affect has been shown to powerfully 
influence both information processing and decision-making. Work in the area of risk perception 
and affect in the United States and Great Britain by Lorenzoni et al. (2006) found that, “the terms 
“global warming” and “climate change”, and their associated images, evoked negative affective 
responses from most respondents. Personally relevant impacts, causes, and solutions to climate 
change were rarely mentioned, indicating that climate change is psychologically distant for most 
individuals in both nations.” Other work describes how confusion results from the fact that 
people relate to global warming through other existing generalized “frames” or “mental models” 
such as “ecological problem” in general, “air pollution” or “ozone depletion” (Dunlap, 1998; 
Stern et, al, 1995).    
  Researchers have also asserted that part of the difficulty is that knowledge of global 
warming requires complex grasp of scientific knowledge in many fields (Johnassen, 2002). 
Researchers have lamented the confusion between global warming and the ozone hole (e.g. Bell 
1994, Bostrom et al.. 1994, Read 1994), investigated the role of media framing (Bell 1994, 
Ungar 1992), and described how understanding global warming requires a complex grasp of 
scientific knowledge in many fields.  
  A more recent example of conceptual explanations for failed public response comes from 
Sterman and Sweeney (2007). These authors note the paradox that most Americans believe 
climate change poses serious risks, but also believe inaccurately that emissions reductions can be 
deferred until there is greater certainty surrounding climate science. “Such wait-and-see policies 
erroneously presume climate change can be reversed quickly should harm become evident, 
underestimating substantial delays in the climate’s response to anthropogenic forcing.” The 
authors conducted experimental work with graduate students at MIT which found that even these  
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highly educated adults had “widespread misunderstanding” of how climate change worked, 
misunderstandings that caused them to systematically underestimate the need for immediate 
action to stabilize the climate. In particular, research subjects conceived of the global climate as 
a system which was analagous to a bathtub filling over, once the input stops the tub level can be 
lowered right away. According to research however, once in the atmosphere, climate gases will 
continue to rise even if emissions fall. The authors write that, “these beliefs – analogous to 
arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow – support wait-and-see policies 
but violate conservation of matter. Low public support for mitigation policies may arise from 
misconceptions of climate dynamics rather than high discount rates or uncertainty about the 
impact of climate change.” Furthermore, the authors link this misunderstanding to the failure of 
response of U.S. policymakers. 
  Harriet Buckeley describes the assumption that information is the limiting factor in 
generating public response as the “information deficit model.” While information deficit 
explanations are indispensable, they do not account for the behavior of the significant number of 
people who do know about global warming, believe it is happening, and express concern 
(Hellevik and Høie 1999). From this perspective people are presented as individual agents acting 
“rationally” in response to information made available to them. According to the information 
deficit model of public response to environmental issues, the public needs to be given more 
knowledge about environmental issues in order to take action . . . In this approach the contextual 
dimensions of environmental concern are ignored so that public perceptions are seen as stable, 
coherent, and consistent, and to exist within individuals rather than being located within the 
inter-subjective contexts of institutions and discourse (2000, 315-316). Yet as Read et al. (1994) 
point out, two simple facts are essential to understanding climate change. If significant global 
warming occurs, it will be primarily the result of an increase in the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere. And the single most important source of carbon dioxide is the 
combustion of fossil fuels, most notably coal and oil. So how can it be that such highly educated 
people don’t know this basic fact?  
  Paradoxically, as evidence for climate change pours in and scientific consensus increases, 
interest in the issue throughout many Western nations declined during the 1990s and into the 
early 2000s (e.g. Hellevik, 2002, Immerwahr, 1999, Saad 2002). For example, Gallup polls for  
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the United States mentioned earlier show that the percentage of people who “personally worry a 
great deal about global warming” dropped from 35% in 1989 to 28% in 2001, while the 
percentage who worry “not at all” rose from 12 to 17% during the same time period (Saad 2002).  
Again, biannual national level survey research in Norway finds a significant and steady 
downward trend in public interest and concern about global warming, with the percentage of 
respondents who replied that they were “very much worried” declining steadily from 40% in 
1989 to less than 10% in 2001 (Hellevik 2002, Barstad and Hellevik 2004). Helevik writes, “A 
decline from such a high level of anxiety is to be expected. There are limits to how long it is 
possible for individuals to live with the extremely pessimistic environmental perspectives 
reflected in the 1989 results. Anxiety reduction mechanisms make people look for brighter 
aspects of development.”  We see evidence of the same pattern in the United States. This finding 
parallels a study by the American Geophysical Union in the United States which reported that 
the percentage of people who worry a great deal about global warming dropped from 35% to 
24% between 1989 and 1997 (Immerwahr, 1999). The AGU study links declining concern to a 
sense of hopelessness and frustration rather than greed or lack of information. The AGU study 
emphasized the public’s feelings of powerlessness and frustration connected to the issue of 
climate change rather than lack of information. This project conducted focus groups to explore 
public understanding of climate change (Immerwahr, 1999).
2 Their work concluded that rather 
than lack of information or concern, the public experienced frustration and paralysis with respect 
to the issue of climate change.  
 
They said they care deeply about global warming, but their concern did not 
translate into any forward motion. As they thought about the problem, they 
seemed to run into brick walls, characterized by lack of clear knowledge, 
seemingly irreversible causes, and a problem with no real solution. As a result 
they were frustrated and eager for a solution but unsure of which way to go. The 
symptoms of this frustration are clear. The first is that people literally don't like to 
think or talk about the subject. Our respondents always seemed to want to move 
 
2Their report, “Waiting for A Signal: Public Attitudes toward Global Warming, the Environment and Geophysical 
Research” is available of the web at http://www.agu.org/sci_soc/attitude_study.html  
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the topic from global warming itself to more familiar topics, such as moral 
deterioration, where at least they felt on firmer ground. 
 
Immerwahr concluded that the public is waiting for two things: scientific consensus and a sense 
of efficacy: “As we have said earlier, informing the public of the problems can increase 
frustration and apathy rather than build support. Our research suggests that what the public is 
most skeptical about is not the existence of problems but our ability to solve them. What will 
make the public invest energy in these issues is not the conviction that the problems are real, but 
that we can do something about them.” This observation regarding efficacy in particular is 
supported by additional studies. For example, political scientist Paul Kellstedt and colleagues 
(2008) have found that increased levels of information about global warming have a negative 
effect on concern and sense of personal responsibility.  The authors examine sense of personal 
efficacy, knowledge and concern regarding climate change, and a number of demographic 
variables. The research yields several striking and important results which are counter to the 
information deficit (or knowledge deficit) standpoint. In particular, respondents who are better 
informed about climate change feel less rather than more responsible for it. Furthermore, they 
find that “in sharp contrast with the knowledge-deficit hypothesis, respondents with higher levels 
of information about global warming show less concern” (120). However, respondents who feel 
personally responsible for climate change reported more concern regarding climate change. 
Unfortunately, (perhaps since their goal is to test the assumptions of knowledge-deficit model), 
the authors do little to explain the underlying mechanism of this relationship. Instead, Kellstedt 
et al. remark that this relationship, “raises provocative questions about what causes some people 
to feel personally responsible for global warming and climate change, and why others feel no 
sense of responsibility for the problem” (121). They go on to use their data to build a 
multivariate model of demographic and other possible predictors of personal efficacy. Older 
respondents were more likely to feel personally responsible for climate change, as were people 
who were holding environmental values. The authors also report the rather paradoxical finding 
(at least from the information-deficit perspective) that those respondents who express confidence 
in climate science reported significantly lower levels of concern about future climate risks. Here 
the authors speculate that this finding may be a result of greater trust in science and technology  
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as sources of solution (though the authors do not provide measures of trust in technological fixes 
to verify such a link). Along this vein is the earlier mentioned work by Krosnic et al. 2006 which 
found that people stopped paying attention to global climate change when they realized that there 
is no easy solution for it, and many people only judged problems as serious if they thought they 
could be effectively acted upon.  
  Most work on concern, knowledge and perception has taken the form of large scale 
surveys. Data from interviews and ethnographic observation can yield information on meanings 
and relationships between thinking and feeling in everyday life. Results from the few studies that 
use interview data also do not support the information deficit model. Instead, their results 
describe a complexity of response, situations of knowing and not-knowing, and the emotional 
ambivalence that characterizes denial. For example Harriet Buckeley (2000) writes, “there is 
concern that public ignorance and illiteracy about global environmental issues is leading to 
misinformed views, apathy, ill-considered calls for government action, and little change in 
personal behavior. This view of the relations between public knowledge, values and actions 
accords with what has been described as an information deficit model: Ignorance about climate 
change is preventing appropriate public action” (ibid, 328). Instead, Buckeley notes that, 
“Confusion, doubt and a degree of illiteracy concerning climate science did not prevent focus 
group participants from locating this global issue in their backyard” (ibid, 322), and “there is a 
need to move from a narrow conception of public knowledge towards recognition of the 
complex, fluid and contradictory nature of public understanding of global environmental issues” 
(ibid, 329). 
  It is important to note that while there are significant criticisms to the information deficit 
model, the idea that people do not need any information regarding climate science to develop 
concern or engage in action is not one of them. In other words, many of the issues discussed by 
researchers here will be returned to under the section on cognitive barriers to action. What is 
important to draw from this section however, is that information alone is not enough to produce 
action, and that “information” like caring as will be discussed below, cannot be thought of as 
generic isolated blocks of “facts” with universal meaning and significance across all 
communities. Instead, information is socially structured, given social meanings, and must be 
understood in social context. As I will illustrate below, information on climate change may be  
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accepted, resisted, navigated and interpreted differently depending upon the sense of efficacy, 
self esteem, and social support of the individuals receiving it. 
“If people only cared” 
A second general way of answering the question of why so few people respond to climate change 
is that people do not care about this problem. According to this perspective, few people are 
engaging because people are either too greedy or too selfish to bother about future generations, 
or don’t care about climate change because they don’t think it will impact them (note: the 
economic corollary that people cannot afford to care will be discussed below). At least in the 
U.S. public, this assessment is not uncommon. We look around, we see that smart people 
continue to carry on highly consumptive behaviors, even in the face of knowledge of their 
consequences, and assume that people are too self-interested to be motivated for change. My 
environmental studies students express this sentiment on a regular basis. Similarly, there is 
evidence for this perspective from the focus groups conducted by the American Geophysical 
Union on climate change: “Many respondents in our focus groups were convinced that the 
underlying cause of environmental problems (such as pollution and toxic waste) is a pervasive 
climate of rampant selfishness and greed, and since they see this moral deterioration to be 
irreversible, they feel that environmental problems are unsolvable. As a result, convincing people 
of the seriousness of the problems is at best only part of the solution, and may, in fact, be 
counterproductive.”  
  As discussed earlier, public opinion data on concern are varied however. Again we refer 
to the earlier mentioned study by Paul Kellstedt on relationships between efficacy, sense of 
responsibility and levels of concern regarding climate change, as well as parallel work by 
Krosnic.  And while concern could be higher, the trend towards concern is worldwide. And that 
concern is increasing. As discussed earlier, Dunlap’s Gallup survey conducted in Canada, the 
U.S., Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, and Russia on public perceptions of global warming found that 
most respondents saw global warming as a problem even as far back as 1992, even though most 
respondents did not understand climate science well. Since that time concern has increased in the 
United States and around the world (see earlier studies on concern). Thus, the notion that people 
do not respond because they do not care about climate change is inadequate.   
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Hierarchy of Needs 
A related explanation to the above “if people only cared” angle emphasizes a kind of Maslow 
“hierarchy of needs,” in which people focus on immediate needs first and long term needs later 
(see e.g. Maslow1970). In this line of reasoning, people cannot think about climate change 
because at best it will affect them in the future and they are too consumed with solving the 
problems of the present. Here we can identify the fact that for many wealthy people in 
industrialized nations climate change is still abstract and distant from their daily lives (Norgaard, 
2006, Nisbet and Myers 2007, Brechin 2008, Lorenzoni et al. 2006). While there is no doubt that 
the hierarchy of needs approach holds weight – indeed each of us is clearly confronted with more 
issues than our attention can handle – this approach alone is insufficient to explain public apathy 
on the larger social level. Individuals in a particular social context may express the feeling that 
they don’t have time and/or may have a limited ability to respond. Yet from a sociological 
standpoint, this information tells us about the social norms, and the limits of concern of that 
particular society. “Needs,” however real they may feel, are a reflection, in affluent places like 
the United States, Japan and Western Europe, where not everybody lives “on the edge,” of social 
facts and local social and cultural norms. For example, in his work on cognitive sociology and 
the social organization of concern and caring, Evitar Zerubavel writes, 
 
After all, only through being socialized does one come to know whether the 
concern about feeding one’s dog should come before or only after the concern 
about feeding the homeless, or whether one ought to be more concerned about the 
well-being of fellow American businessmen in Southeast Asia or the Southeast 
Asian refugees living in one’s own neighborhood (1997, 47). 
 
People in the United States and wealthy societies throughout the world may feel that they cannot 
use less fossil fuel because they “need” to be able to drive their kids to soccer practice or take an 
annual trip to Greece. But these kinds of needs are very much a product of social context (e.g. 
norms and expectations) rather than a hierarchy of needs per se. In fact, there is virtually no 
evidence to support the perspective that climate change just doesn’t pan out in a hierarchy of 
needs. For example, the European nation that is threatened most by sea level rise, the 
Netherlands, is at the very bottom of concern for climate change in ACNielsen’s 2007 global  
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study of nations. And in the U.S. Zahran et al. (2006) find that “respondents living within 1 mile 
of the nearest coastline at negative relative elevation to the coast are less (not more) likely to 
support government-led climate initiatives (p 783). Again in relation to the hierarchy of needs 
argument, consider the earlier discussed negative relationships between wealth and concern at 
individual, state level and national data (e.g. Sandvik 2008).  
“All Is Well” 
A fourth explanation for the fact that people around the world have engaged in so little response 
to climate change is that they believe that everything is fine. This could be either because they do 
not think climate change is happening, believe that their governments will take care of things, or 
that international agreements on emissions reductions will be effective. This perspective could be 
a variation of either “climate skepticism,” “faith in government” or “technological optimism.” A 
sense of all being well can also be a reflection of faith in a higher power, or a sense of fate. Let 
us consider an in depth example in Norway: In the past decades, the Norwegian government has 
become visibly involved in the issue of climate change. Perhaps residents felt that things were in 
good hands? Norwegian sociologist Ottar Hellevik explores the possibility of faith in the 
government as a causal factor behind the national pattern of declining concern about climate 
change since 1980. He does not, however, interpret optimism as the force behind the trend in 
declining concern. Rather, “results from the Monitor surveys tend to contradict such a trend of 
optimism, however. The percentage disagreeing with the proposition – “When negative 
environmental conditions are revealed, business takes the problem seriously and cleans up as 
soon as possible” – rose from 45 percent in 1995 to 56 and 55 percent in 1997, 1999 and 2001 
respectively. The public thus seems to have become more rather than less skeptical with regard 
to the environmental status of business leaders. Further, when queried in 2001 as to anticipated 
development trends for selected areas of society, only 14 percent of the population believed that 
the situation with regard to environment and pollution would improve, while 31 percent expected 




3 p.13 in Ottar Hellevik “Beliefs, Attitudes and Behavior Towards the Environment” pp 7-19 in Realizing Rio in 
Norway. This phenomenon is also reported in the United States (see, e.g., Immerwahr, 1999).  
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THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CLIMATE DENIAL 
 
We can understand this failure of information to move through the public awareness and into 
policy outcomes as a failure of communicative action. But to understand both why it is 
happening, and what to do next, we must look to the sociology of denial. Most research to date 
has examined denial on the level of individual psychology. Yet as a sociologist I will argue that 
both what individuals hear and choose to pay attention to, or ignore, must be understood within 
the context of both social norms shaping interpersonal interaction and the broader political 
economic context. This next section gives an outline of my own work (see also Norgaard 2006a 
and 2006b). 
“We Don’t Really Want to Know” 
  Based on the above survey of psychological and sociological factors, it seems clear that 
how we respond to information that is highly disturbing (information for example about a lack of 
certainty of our future survival), information that challenges the basics of our social organization 
is a complex process. Traditionally a question like “how do we communicate climate science to 
the public” has been seen as a problem of science communication – which it obviously is. But 
the problem here is not only about the communication of scientific information, but how to 
communicate both scientific and social scientific information about climate change to the public 
in a way that the information engenders engagement with social and policy implications.   
  In my ethnographic and interview data, people described a sense of knowing and not 
knowing about climate change, of having information but not thinking about it in their everyday 
lives. Overall this situation can be described as a “double life.” Information from climate science 
is known in the abstract, but disconnected from, and invisible within political, social or private 
life. Contrary to widespread assumptions that people fail to respond to global warming because 
they are too poorly informed, too greedy or too individualistic, suffer from incorrect mental 
models or faulty decision-making processes, people I have interviewed in both the U.S. and 
Norway expressed feelings of deep concern and caring and a significant degree of ambivalence 
about the state of the world (Norgaard 2006a, 2006b). This data indicates that people want to 
protect themselves from disturbing information in order to 1) avoid emotions of fear, guilt and  
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helplessness, 2) follow cultural norms and 3) maintain positive conceptions of individual and 
national identity. Those interviewed described fears about the severity of climate change, of not 
knowing what to do, that their way of life was threatened, and showed concern that the 
government would not adequately handle the problem. They described feelings of guilt for their 
own actions, and the difficulty of discussing the issue of climate change with their children. 
Talking about global warming went against cultural norms of conversation. It wasn't a topic that 
people were able to speak about with ease - rather, overall it was an area of confusion and 
uncertainty. Yet feeling this confusion and uncertainty went against emotional norms of 
toughness and maintaining control. Furthermore, thinking about climate change threatens our 
sense of individual identity and our trust in our government's ability to respond. At the deepest 
level, large scale environmental problems such as global warming threaten people's sense of the 
continuity of life - what sociologist Anthony Giddens calls ontological security.  
  Ignoring the obvious can, however, be a lot of work. Both the reasons for and process of 
denial are socially organized; that is to say, both cognition and denial are socially structured.  
Denial is socially organized because societies develop and reinforce a whole repertoire of 
techniques or "tools" for ignoring disturbing problems. Individuals may block out or distance 
themselves from certain information in order to maintain coherent meaning systems (Gecas and 
Burke, 1995), desirable emotional states (Rosenberg, 1991, Meijndes et. al, 2001), a sense of 
self-efficacy (Gecas and Burke 1995), and in order to follow norms of attention, emotion 
(Hochschild, 1983), and conversation (Eliasoph, 1998). If society organizes patterns of 
perception, memory and organizational aspects of thinking (Zerubavel, 1997), then studies of 
perception that focus solely on individuals are unable to grasp the meaning of differences across 
cultures, subcultures or nationalities.  More importantly, a focus on individuals in the absence of 
attention to immediate culture or economic context leaves out relationships between individual 
cognition and the larger social context.   
  In the community where I did my research, collectively holding information about global 
warming at arm's length took place by participating in cultural norms of attention, emotion, and 
conversation, and by using a series of cultural narratives to deflect disturbing information and 
normalize a particular version of reality in which "everything is fine.” Emotions of fear and 
helplessness can be managed through the use of selective attention, such as controlling one's  
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exposure to information, not thinking too far into the future, and focusing on something that 
could be done.  
  People have told me many things about why it was difficult to think about global 
warming.  In the words of one person who held his hands in front of his eyes as he spoke, 
“people want to protect themselves a bit.” They described feelings of guilt for their own actions 
and the difficulty of discussing the issue of climate change with their children.  Again, earlier 
mentioned work by both Krosnic and Kelstedt tells us that such factors will decrease action and 
concern. In some sense, not wanting to know was connected to not knowing how to know.  
  Talking about global warming also went against conversation norms. Conversation is 
governed by rules called conversation norms that shape what is acceptable and not acceptable to 
say in different contexts (Eliasoph, 1998). In this case, climate change wasn’t a topic that people 
were able to speak about with ease – rather it was an area of confusion and uncertainty. 
Conversation is the site for exchange of information and ideas, for human contact and the 
building of community. It is also an important site for the creation of collective meaning making 
and reality (see e.g. Gamson 1992, Eliasoph, 1998). Conversation can help people understand 
their relationships to the larger world, or obscure them. It can engage the sociological 
imagination, that “quality of mind necessary to grasp the constant interplay between our private 
lives and the political world” (Mills, 1959, 13). Conversation can also do the complete opposite.  
Furthermore, feeling this confusion and uncertainty went against emotional norms of 
toughness and maintaining control. Knowing about global warming raised issues of ontological 
security, feelings of helplessness, feelings of guilt and was a threat to individual identity. Note 
that psychological phenomena discussed earlier underlie each of these tendencies (e.g. 
Kellstedt’s work on the relationship between efficacy and action). Here I use the voices of 
community members to lay out a series of unpleasant emotions linked to climate change.  
British sociologist Stanely Cohen describes three varieties of denial: literal, interpretive 
and implicatory (2001). Literal denial is “the assertion that something did not happen or is not 
true” (ibid. 7). With respect to the issue of global warming, this form of denial is akin to the 
generation of counter-claims by oil companies that climate change is simply not happening (see 
e.g. McCright and Dunlap 2000, McCright and Dunlap 2003, Gelbspan 1997). A second variety 
is interpretive denial in which the facts themselves are not denied, but they are given a different  
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interpretation. Euphemisms, technical jargon and word changing are used to dispute the meaning 
of events. For example, military officials speak of “collateral damage” rather than the killing of 
citizens. 
Cohen’s third category is implicatory denial. In this case what is minimized is not 
information, but “the psychological, political or moral implications that conventionally follow” 
(ibid. 8). What I observed in my work has not been a rejection of information per se, but the 
failure to integrate this knowledge into everyday life or transform it into social action. As Cohen 
puts it, “the facts of children starving to death in Somalia, mass rape of women in Bosnia, a 
massacre in East Timor, homeless people in our streets are recognized, but are not seen as 
psychologically disturbing or as carrying a moral imperative to act . . . Unlike literal or 
interpretive denial, knowledge itself is not at issue, but doing the ‘right’ thing with the 
knowledge”(ibid. 9). 
Risk, Modern Life and Fears Regarding Ontological Security 
Automobile and plane crashes, toxic chemical spills and explosions, nuclear 
accidents, food contamination, genetic manipulation, the spread of AIDS, global 
climate change, ozone depletion, species extinction and the persistence of nuclear 
weapons arsenals: the list goes on. Risks abound and people are increasingly 
aware that no one is entirely safe from the hazards of modern living. Risk reminds 
us of our dependency, interdependency and vulnerability. Catastrophic risk is an 
even stronger reminder (Jaeger et al., 2001, 13). 
 
Large scale environmental issues in general and global warming in particular threaten biological 
conditions, economic prospects and social structure. The impacts of global warming on human 
society are predicted to be widespread and potentially catastrophic. “Ontological security refers 
to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and the 
constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action” (Giddens, 1991, 92). 
Norwegians described how merely thinking about climate change raised a series of questions 
related to ontological security.  If the climate continues to warm, how are people going to survive 
in fifty years? – in one hundred? What will Norwegian winters be like without snow? What will 
happen to farms in the community in the next generation? Bjorn, a father in his mid-thirties, 
described how in as few as a hundred years it may not be possible to live on the planet:   
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. . . we have now come so far that we have begun to see that environment that can 
mean to protect or not to protect the environment we are living in, you know, in 
one hundred years it’s possible that the environment will be damaged to the point 
that it isn’t possible to live on earth any more, you know? 
 
Giddens’ notion of ontological security refers to the “Confidence or trust that the natural and 
social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and 
social identity” (1984, 375). Yet Robert Lifton writes that today, “widespread imagery of 
extinction, of an end to humankind... casts doubt in each mind about the self's larger 
connectedness . . . Increasingly we have an amorphous but greatly troubling sense that something 
has gone wrong with our relationship to nature, something that may undermine its capacity to 
sustain life” (1982, 21). 
A Series of Negative Emotions 
Helplessness 
Helplessness was a second emotion that the topic of climate change evoked. Trying to think 
about this problem could be overwhelming to people. The problem seemed so large: solving 
climate change would involve the cooperation and common work of people in many different 
countries, governments were unable to reach agreement, and perhaps entire economic structures 
would have to change. Even if all of this change were to be achieved, all the carbon dioxide 
released up to the present will still continue to cause climate change. Thus it is not surprising 
that, rather than feeling that there was much that could be done, one resident, Liv, a woman in 
her late sixties, pronounced that, “We must take it as it comes.” And Lene told me, “And of 
course its climate change which is doing it. There isn’t anything to be done about it.”   
Beyond the dimension of powerlessness that comes from the situation itself, yet still connected 
to it, is the possibility that those political and economic structures that have been set in place are 
inadequate to handle the problem. Thus for some residents, there was another layer to the feeling 
of powerlessness that came from considering the possibility that one’s government and/or the 
world community at large could not be relied upon to solve this problem.   
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Fear of Guilt 
Thinking about climate change was also difficult for people I spoke with because it raised 
feelings of guilt. People told me they were aware of how their actions contributed to the problem, 
and they felt guilty about it. Eirik describes the difficulty of living by his conscience: 
 
We shouldn’t consume so many resources. Drive so much, or travel so much by 
air. We know that it is bad because it increases CO2 levels. And creates a worse 
situation. But at the same time of course we want to go on vacation, we want to 
go to the South, we want to, well, live a normal life for today. So many times I 
have a guilty conscience because I know that I should do something, or do it less. 
But at the same time there is the social pressure. And I want for my children and 
for my wife to be able to experience the same positive things that are normal in 
their community of friends and in this society. It is very... I think it is a bit 
problematic. I feel that I could do more, but it would be at the expense of, it 
would perhaps create a more difficult relationship between me and my children or 
my partner and in general. It really isn’t easy.  
 
Norwegian sociologist Anne Nilsen’s interviews with Norwegian youth on climate change and 
their sense of the future contain similar expressions of both powerlessness and guilt. Here is an 
interview excerpt from a 23-year-old young woman in Nilsen’s study. The respondent’s 
reflections are in reaction to the environment and the Third World (she had just mentioned 
climate change in preceding passage):  
It’s terrible to think of, that we live so well while others live in such miserable 
circumstances. Of course it’s very good to have a comfortable life . . . I enjoy it . . 
. but I feel so bad about the others, the rest. I have a guilty conscience, that’s why 
I try not to think about it, keep it at a distance. . . I still think these are important 
matters, but it’s as if I can’t make myself be concerned all the time, not any more . 
. . Terribly important these matters, but I don’t feel involved in a way, don’t want  
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to get involved. There are so many things to care about, so much information, we 
know so much about the connections between things in the world, in a way you 
are obliged to understand and to care. I suppose that’s why my family has become 
more and more important to me, my everyday life, that which is near (Nilsen, 184, 
1999). 
 
Fear of “Being a Bad Person”: Individual and National Identity 
A related concern with awareness of climate change was the threat it implies for individual and 
national identities. Citizens of wealthy nations who fail to respond to the issue of climate change 
benefit from their denial in economic terms. They also benefit by avoiding the emotional and 
psychological entanglement and identity conflicts that may arise from knowing that one is doing 
“the wrong thing.” Social psychologists Victor Gecas and Peter Burke describe how “Various 
self-theories suggest that people's self-conceptions are valued and protected and that a low self-
evaluation (on criteria that matter) is an uncomfortable condition which people are motivated to 
avoid. This may occur through increased efforts and self-improvement or (more typically) 
through such self serving activities as selective perception and cognition, various strategies of 
impression management, and restructuring the environment and/or redefining the situation to 
make it reflect a more favorable view of the self” (1995). Although coming from a different 
tradition, social psychological work on identity complements work on emotion and cognition and 
emotion management. In general, "People work hard to verify and maintain the self-concepts or 
identities they already hold, and do not easily change them" (1995). On a social psychological 
level, the fact that Trudi finds it unpleasant to think that she or other Norwegians might “distance 
themselves from others,” makes it less likely that she will want to pay attention to the situation 
that causes this unpleasant feeling. For example, the Norwegian public self-image has included a 
strong self-identification of being environmentally aware and humanitarian (Eriksen, 1993; 
1996). Norwegians have been proud of their international leadership on a number of 
environmental issues including climate change. Yet information about climate change – 
including Norway’s inability to reach Kyoto reduction quotas, increasing petroleum 
development, and its’ participation in the umbrella group – contradicts the official national image  
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of environmental concern. People I interviewed in the community were widely aware of this 
issue.  
Difficult to Link to Daily Life 
No doubt a central challenge in our attempt to grapple with climate change is connected to 
qualities outlined in Ulrich Beck’s work on the Risk Society. In particular, rather than a problem 
we can touch and see for ourselves, climate change is a threat which must be interpreted for us 
through scientific expertise, using complex instrumentation. As a result, the environmental 
problem of contaminated water feels invisible to those who can easily afford to buy their water 
bottled. And the issue of climate change will deeply affect (or perhaps now affects) nations with 
less infrastructure long before it will significantly touch the lives of Norwegians. As a result, 
ecological collapse seems a fanciful issue to those in the “safe” and “stable” societies of the 
North as we buy our fruits and vegetables from South America, our furniture from Southeast 
Asia, and send our wastes into the common atmosphere. And with the dynamics of global 
capitalism in which gaps between rich and poor increase, issues of global environmental justice 
and denial will become increasingly salient for what Stanley Cohen aptly terms “educated and 
comfortable people living in stable societies” (2001, xvi).  
 
COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL BARRIERS TO ACTION 
 
Based on the above review (and additional articles in the annotated bibliography) we can place 
barriers to response into three broad categories: 1) psychological/conceptual barriers, 2) social 
and cultural barriers and 3) structural (political economy). The first two categories have been 
summarized in detail in the preceding section. Hopefully by this point it is clear that these 
categories are not mutually exclusive, and represent different disciplinary approaches to the 
question of failed response as much as anything else. It is also important to note that these 
barriers to response are for privileged people who do appear to have adequate information. There 
are millions of poor people around the world who face outright economic and structural barriers 
to their ability to effectively respond to climate change. This schema does not apply to them.  
  34 
Psychological and Conceptual Barriers 
Considered in detail under the previous section on existing explanations and in the annotated 
bibliography.  
Table 1 Responding to Climate Change: Psychological and Conceptual Barriers  
Cognitive 
dissonance 
Individuals may block out or distance themselves from certain information 




Desire to protect 
individual 
identity 
People are motivated to avoid threats to identity. Such threats may be 
mitigated by selective perception and cognition, and/or redefining the 
situation to make it reflect a more favorable view of the self 
Victor Gecas and 
Peter Burke 1995 
Incorrect mental models lead to widespread confusion in the general public, 
including confusion between ozone hole and global climate change, between 
weather and climate, and regarding causes of climate change 
Bostrom, Ann, M. 
Granger Morgan, 
Baruch Fischoff 
and Daniel Read 




“widespread misunderstanding” of how climate change works caused 
respondents to systematically underestimate the need for immediate action . 
. . Low public support may arise from misconceptions of climate dynamics. 
Sterman and 
Sweeney 2007 
Affect: Affect, the positive or negative evaluation of an object, idea, or 
mental image, has been shown to powerfully influence individual processing 




Efficacy: “People stop paying attention to global climate change when they 
realize that there is no easy solution for it. Many people judge as serious 
only those problems for which they think action can be taken.” 
Krosnick, Jon, 
Allyson Holbrook, 
Laura Lowe and 
Penny Visser 
2006    
Efficacy: Personal efficacy regarding climate change is strongest predictor 
of concern. Increased levels of information about global warming have a 





Individuals may block out or distance themselves from certain information 
in order to maintain a sense of self-efficacy  
Gecas and Burke 
1995 






Negative emotions:  Individuals may block out or distance themselves from 
certain information in order to maintain desirable emotional states   
Rosenberg Morris 
1991, Stoll-
Kleeman et al. 
2001, Meijndes, 
Midden and 
Wilke. 2001.  
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Social and Cultural Barriers 
These have also been considered in detail under the previous section on existing explanations 
and in the annotated bibliography.  
 
Table 2 Social and Cultural Barriers to Responding to Climate Change 
National 
Identity 
Information on high carbon footprints 
contradicts patriotic national pride 
Norgaard, Kari 2006b, Sandvik, Hanno 2008 
Complexity of modern life, knowledge 
specialization and overload 
Ungar, Sheldon 2003 
 Modern world risks disrupt underlying sense 
of stability e.g. our sense of ontological 
security  
Anthony Giddens, 1991, Norgaard 2006 a, b  
Risk Society 
“Disembeddeness:” Collapsing time and 
space, risks perceived as remote from daily 
life.  
Anthony Giddens, 1991, Norgaard 2006a and 
2006b 
Society organizes many aspects of thinking, 
including patterns of perception and memory. 
Zerubavel, Evitar 2006, 2008, Norgaard 2006a 
and 2006b 




Norms of time: Future is vague, feels distant.  Norgaard 2006b, Zerubavel, Evitar 2006 
Norgaard 2006a Feeling fear or helplessness 
violates emotion These can be managed by 
these strategies of  “Selective Attention” 
  Controlling Exposure to Information 
  Not thinking too far ahead 
  Focusing on something you can do 
Fear, Helplessness 
Also Immerwahr 1999, Opotow andWeiss 
2000, Giddens on ontological security. 
Violates emotion norms of national pride, 
managed in Norway by changing the angle of 
vision or “perspectival selectivity:” 
“At least we’re not as bad as the Americans” 





Guilt (related to threats to identity as a good 
person) 
See also Sandvik, Hanno 2008,  Opotow and 
Weiss 2000  
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Political Economic Barriers 
At the broadest level, what individuals think and do is shaped by government policy and political 
climate. Scholars have identified a series of barriers to effective action on climate change that 
result from the relationship between the political system and the economy. These are: 1) the 
ability of the fossil fuel industry to influence government policy direction (the U.S. holds 
prominent examples), 2) the generation of climate skeptic campaigns funded by fossil fuel 
interest groups (almost exclusively an issue in the U.S.), 3) a lack of quality information on 
climate change in the media, and 4) the “normal” distortion of climate science through the 
“balance as bias phenomenon.”  
  The current economic system of all developed nations is organized around fossil fuel 
consumption and production. For this reason, all developed nations face major structural barriers 
in moving their economies away from high emissions scenarios. Additionally, there are vested 
interests in slowing change, especially for nations who receive revenue from fossil fuel 
production or have strong ties between government and auto or petroleum industries. For 
example, while it is in the best long term interest of all nations to reduce emission, it is not 
equally in the interest of powerful oil and coal companies to alter their course, at least not in the 
short term. The oil company Exxon Mobile has become the prime example of this phenomenon 
in which fossil fuel interests systematically manipulate government documents and carry out 
campaigns of misinformation regarding the state of climate science.  
  Many have now outlined the serious threat to democracy posed by capital’s control of the 
production and dissemination of knowledge  – e.g. the fact that increased corporate control of 
media limits and molds available information about global warming (Dispensa and Brulle 2003), 
and corporate funded research centers generate conflicting knowledge (McCright and Dunlap 
2003, McCright and Dunlap 2000). Such political economic barriers have far reaching and 
interactive effects with the other barriers discussed above.  
  Although discussion of climate skepticism may appear beyond the scope of cognitive and 
behavioral barriers to public response to climate change, there are at least three identifiable 
impacts of climate skepticism on the American public’s response to climate change. First, a 
portion of the public believes the skeptic claim that global warming is a hoax. Recent work by 
Dunlap et al. (2008) and others as outlined earlier indicate that some percentage of the public,  
  37 
especially self identified Republicans do believe this. The second and third impacts of climate 
skepticism on public response are more pervasive and insidious. One of these, as brilliantly 
articulated by Boykoff (2004, 2008), is that the media have picked up on and expanded the 
influence of these actions through recreating a broader perception of uncertainty in the balance as 
bias mechanism described earlier. Also, the existence of a broader debate about climate science 
creates an atmosphere of wait and see, which allows a screen for those who do believe there is a 
problem, but are too uncomfortable to allow themselves to become further engaged.  
 
Table 3 Structural or Political Economic Barriers in Responding to Climate Change 
Lack of information in 
news media 
Bell, 1994, Ungar 1992, Mazur, Allan 1998 
Discourses and framing 
in media 
Armitage, Kevin 2005 
Jacques, Peter, Riley Dunlap and Mark Freeman 2008  
McCright, Aaron M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2000. 
McCright, Aaron M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2003  
Brossard, Dominique; Shanahan, James; McComas, Katherine 2004, 
Carvalho, Anabela 2007 and 2005 
Dunwoody; Sharon 2007 
Sonnett, John H. 2006 
Weiskel, Timothy 2005. 
Balance as bias in news 
media 
Boykoff series 




Gelbspan, Ross 2004 
Jacques, Peter, Riley Dunlap and Mark Freeman 2008 
McCright and Dunlap 2003 
Fossil fuel influence on 
policy discourse 
Gelbspan, Ross 2004 
McCright, Aaron M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2000. 
McCright, Aaron M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2003  
Dispensa, Jaclyn Marissa and Robert J. Brulle 2003. 
Michaels, David and Celeste Monforton 2005. 
Freudenburg, William, Robert Gramling and Debra J. Davidson 2008.  
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ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE IN MEDIA 
 
News media are the primary source of the public’s information on climate change worldwide. 
Thus, if there is a link between information and public response, the presence or absence of 
information on climate change in news media would be important to consider. Cognitive 
sociologists have also pointed out that news media are important in shaping the social agenda. 
Whether something is important or not is communicated both by its presence on the news, and 
how it is portrayed. Furthermore, while there are a range of actions individuals can take in 
response to climate change, from behavioral changes that reduce their own carbon footprints, to 
participating in local and regional planning efforts and putting pressure on legislature and 
government officials. Some of these actions are significantly more effective than others. While 
all levels of response are necessary, climate change is a global problem, and national leadership 
will be required to bring the emissions of climate gasses down to the desired targets. Voluntary 
and individual actions alone will be ineffective. Thus in order to be an effective agent of change, 
the news media will need to 1) portray a sense of the seriousness of the problem, 2) communicate 
that climate change can and should be solved, and 3) give accurate messages about effective 
responses. Do news media around the world facilitate behavioral response to climate change, or 
do they prevent it? Meta analysis of existing studies indicates that none of these three criteria 
have been met.  
Presence of Climate Change as a Serious Topic 
Considering first whether or not climate change is visible in the news media, we look at several 
early studies. Although most of the English language material reviewed here focuses on the 
United States, work has addressed media in England, France and New Zealand, among others.  
In general, climate change has been visible in the news media worldwide at least as far back as 
1988 when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was founded. The IPCC has 
produced widely publicized reports on the state of climate science since the first assessment was 
released in 1990.  In the United States Nisbet and Myers (2007) note that there was minimal 
news attention to climate change during the first half of the 1980s, However, by September 1988, 
a record summer heat may have been behind a major upswing in media attention. Furthermore,  
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Nisbet and Myers (2007) do note a connection between media exposure to information and 
public concern: “Across dimensions of public opinion, we observed strong connections between 
patterns in media attention to global warming and shifts in poll trends. In no area is the 
connection clearer than the public’s “discovery” of global warming as a problem.” Information 
alone may not always translate to the public. For example, in a 1994 article Bell compares the 
public knowledge of climate change in New Zealand with media coverage in the preceding year. 
The author identifies “considerable mismatch” between media reporting of climate science and 
public understanding. In general Bell finds that despite accurate coverage in the news media, the 
public knows little about causes of climate change. Instead, the public overestimates temperature 
and sea level rise scenarios and is confused between the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion.   
  Although there has been climate coverage, scholars have noted one limitation is that 
issues follow a "media-attention cycle." This limits the continued presence of climate change in 
the public arena. Work on media coverage and the attention cycle by Alan Mazur (1998) 
indicates that climate change was present in the US media in the late 1980s up until 1990, after 
which point coverage declined, even though scientific consensus increased during that time, and 
the Clinton White House was sympathetic to environmental concerns from 1992 until 2000. 
Mazur also hypothesizes that attention to climate change spread from the US media to media 
coverage in other nations.  
  However, in their comparison of newspaper coverage of climate change in France and the 
US from 1987 to 1997, Brossard, and co authors observe that the "media-attention cycle," which 
is apparent for the American coverage, is not as significant in French coverage (2004). 
Furthermore, they find that France's coverage of climate change was more closely linked to 
events, focused more on international relations, and presented a more restricted range of 
viewpoints on global warming than did American coverage. American coverage emphasized 
conflicts between scientists and politicians, a trend that was not observed in France. 
Framing Climate Change in News Media 
A second key dimension of news coverage is whether climate change is portrayed as serious. 
Here a number of studies have examined the accuracy of media representations of scientific 
findings. For example, in order to address whether the U.S. media present a biased view of  
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global warming, Dispensa and Brulle conducted a content analysis of three countries' newspaper 
articles and  two international scientific journals in (2000, 2003). U.S. media portray global 
warming as controversial, whereas media portrayals in Finland and New Zealand are on par with 
presentations commonly found in the international scientific journals. They next compare media 
presentations in the United States, New Zealand and Finland with the country’s economy, 
industry and environment. Dispensa and Brulle conclude that in the US the fossil fuel industry, 
has a significant impact on the media coverage of global warming in comparison to New Zealand 
and Finland, where it does not. 
  Work on language and framing shapes the public perception of the seriousness of 
information, as well as whether or not there is anything that can be done. In a recent doctoral 
dissertation, John Sonnett (2006) notes differences in language representation between the 
scientific community, the news media and the oil industry: scientists speak of “climate change,” 
the news media of “global warming,” and the oil industry of “greenhouse gases.”  
  Probably the most significant issue regarding news media framing of climate change 
concerns the coverage of scientific uncertainty. In the United States in particular, media are 
found to magnify the perception of uncertainty of climate scientists. Here a series of articles by 
Maxwell Boykoff, some co-authored with Jules Boykoff are centrally important. Boykoff 
describes how the journalistic norm of “balance” in which interview time or print space is 
provided to both sides of a controversial story in fact produces “biased” coverage. Journalists 
have provided space to both key climate scientists and climate skeptics. As a result, the scientific 
consensus regarding climate change is not translated to the public. Instead of providing balance, 
this norm magnifies the perception of uncertainty in the public mind, leading to a false 
appearance of uncertainty and debate. This perception of uncertainty has moved from the media 
into both public and policy discourse.  
  Boykoff has conducted a series of content analyses in both print and television media. 
For example in his analysis of television news coverage of climate change in United States 
network television and cable news from 1995 through 2004, Boykoff found that 70% of U.S. 
television news segments have provided ‘balanced’ coverage regarding anthropogenic 
contributions to climate change. Boykoff concludes that as a result of the journalistic norm of 
balanced reporting, United States television news coverage has “perpetrated an informational  
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bias by significantly diverging from the consensus view in climate science that humans 
contribute to climate change” (2008). Similar studies have been done in U.S. print media.  
  This trend seems to be most prominent in the United States. For example, comparative 
work mentioned earlier by Brossard, et al. (2004) between the U.S. and France found that 
American coverage emphasized conflicts between scientists and politicians, whereas this was not 
observed in France. Boykoff’s work comparing the United States and United Kingdom shows the 
same. The prevalence of “balanced” reporting in newspaper coverage of climate change in the 
United States and United Kingdom from 2003 and 2006 shows a significant “divergence” from 
scientific consensus in the U.S. in 2003–4, but no major “divergence” in UK reporting. Boykoff 
speculates that his findings “inform ongoing considerations about the spatially-differentiated 
media terms and conditions through which current and future climate policy is negotiated and 
implemented.” 
  The questioning of scientific certainty in the media is a recent phenomenon, and one 
worth devoting some attention to. The scientific process provides a mechanism for falsification, 
but not “proof.” This quality, together with the lack of public understanding of science has been 
manipulated in recent years. Given that all science contains a measure of uncertainty, if agencies 
can be prevented from imposing regulations until they are unambiguously “justified,” regulations 
can be defeated or postponed, often for decades. For example, sociologist Reiner Grundmann 
compares the relationship between scientific certainty and policy prescriptions in the cases of 
ozone layer protection and climate change (2006). Although scientific expertise is obviously a 
requirement for policy development in either case, Grundmann notes that highly successful 
policies to combat ozone depletion were agreed upon under conditions of far less scientific 
certainty than currently exists for climate change. And despite the greater scientific consensus, 
climate agreements attempted by world political leaders have been far lass successful.  
  Authors Michaels and Monforton provide a historical view into the process of 
"manufacture uncertainty" in the United States by opponents of public health and environmental 
regulations (2005). Michaels and Monforton provide historical data from the tobacco and other 
industries and document the rise of the label "junk science" to de-legitimize research that 
threatens powerful interests. This process is carried out as industries question the validity of 
scientific evidence on which the regulations are based. They highlight that the industry strategy  
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of manufacturing uncertainty is in opposition to the public health model, under which decisions 
should be made using the best available evidence in order to ensure the protection of the public’s 
health and the environment. 
  Similarly, Freudenburg, Gramling and Davidson (2008) trace the increasing call for 
scientific certainty, or “proof” in public discourse before policies can be implemented. This 
practice of calling for continued further study has allowed profitable but potentially risky 
activities to continue unabated. Based on their review of previously documented controversies, 
the authors suggest that “such calls may reflect not just a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
nature of science, but a clever and surprisingly effective political-economic tactic—“Scientific 
Certainty” Argumentation Methods, or SCAMs.” They further suggest that such SCAMs are 
both more widespread than has been previously recognized, and should be the focus of more 
attention in the future.  
  In addition to analyses of total numbers of news stories, the language, frames, and 
discourses employed, several authors have addressed indirect influences of the media on the 
dominant social perception of climate change. Timothy Weiskel (2005) describes a “politics of 
distraction” in the US media which he argues accounts for at least part of why the public fails to 
respond to climate change. Weiskel describes the movement of celebrities into the White House 
as well as increased ties of the news media to the entertainment industry. Sociologist Anabela 
Carvalho describes two “background” ways that news media contribute to the normalization of 
climate change (2007). On the one hand, “the media is a culprit that instigates materialism by 
constantly promoting wealth and consumption while acting almost in collusion with the main 
forces that foment global warming for sake of advertising revenue.” Furthermore, Carvalho 
observes that mainstream media provide news mainly from the Northern hemisphere, Western 
Europe and American-based news. As a result, it steers the gaze of viewers away from parts of 
the world where climate impacts may be most visible. 
Media Messages about Responses to Climate Change: Can Anything 
Be Done, and If So, What 
Work from both psychology and sociology indicates that in order for the public to respond to a 
problem, in addition to information they must have information, a sense that something can be  
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done and accurate direction about effective action. Significantly less attention has focused on 
media representations along these dimensions. However, given that the U.S. media are not 
consistently portraying climate change as serious, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. media are 
also not providing a sense that something can be done, or direction as to what that would be.  
  Krosnick, Holbrook and Visser 2000 examine the effect of the Clinton campaign to put 
global climate change into the spotlight during the fall of 1997 in order to build support for 
Kyoto. The authors examine (1) What were Americans' beliefs and attitudes about global 
warming before the debate? (2) Did the debate catch the public's attention? and (3) Did the 
debate change people's beliefs and attitudes about global warming? They observed that a 
majority of the American general public endorsed the views advocated by Clinton before the 
media campaign began. They concluded that “the debate did attract people's attention and 
strengthened the public's beliefs and attitudes,” but “produced almost no changes in public 
opinion when the nation's population is lumped together.” 
  Regarding effective messages for action in the United States, even the film that many 
believe finally popped the bubble of complacency in the United States, An Inconvenient Truth, 
contains primarily suggestions for individual behavioral changes rather than institutional and 




One of the basic premises of a modern democratic society is that we can use scientific expertise 
to inform rational public policy. On the one hand, much of the literature we have reviewed points 
to failures in this model (e.g. the lack of applicability of the information deficit model). How can 
the knowledge that there are psychological and social barriers to our effective action be turned 
into a basis of pro-active public policy?  Here we draw upon a combination of literature from 
social psychology, social movements about what motivates people to participate, and the specific 
findings discussed above.  
Barriers to effective engagement in response to climate change exist on all scales from 
the individual to the institutional, and these dimensions clearly interact. We develop the 
following practical implications in response to the psychological, social/cultural, and political  
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economic response barriers outlined in Tables 1-3. A visual presentation of key response barriers 
by category and possible policy implications is provided in Tables 4, 5 and 6 below. Note that 
there are numerous barriers outlined earlier, not all of which translate obviously into tangible 
policy directions.  
The single most important policy implication from the literature summarized in this 
report is that a significant opportunity exists for generating greater engagement in response to 
climate change. Data from the above studies indicate that people DO care about climate change, 
and do support stronger climate policies. The notion that people already want to “do the right 
thing” is an extremely hopeful piece of information which can and should be used as the 
centerpiece of developing successful policy. The presence of such support has been masked by 
our misinterpretation of the psychological mechanisms of denial. This implication is woven 
through the following charts where appropriate. 
Although psychological, social and political economic barriers are listed as separate 
categories, they are obviously related to and reinforce one another. An example of this is the fact 
that so many well informed individuals feel unable to make change in a world where the fossil 
fuel industry has so much power. It is important to acknowledge that such “psychological” 
barriers are in response to very real conditions of political inequality. In order to counter the fact 
that people don’t like to feel powerless, we must not only design policies in which citizens 
appear more powerful, but we also need to provide a playing field upon which their actions 
actually do matter.  
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Table 4 Policy Implications in light of Psychological and Conceptual Barriers  
Cognitive dissonance (blocking 
certain information in order to 
maintain coherent meaning 
systems). 
Desire to protect individual 
identity 
(people avoid threats to identity). 
To the extent possible and realistic, frame climate 
message in ways that are non-threatening, see 
below also. Provide media information campaigns 
and participation opportunities that build on a 
favorable view of the self.  Present information 
and design policies that appeal to a positive sense 
of self.  
Mental models of public are 
conceptually flawed. 
Although these do matter, information per se may 
not be as limiting as presumed.  
Role of affect, efficacy and 
negative emotions as response 
barriers. 
(Climate change evokes negative 
affect; thinking about it leads to 
negative emotions; thinking about 
it is disempowering).  
 
Create positive associations, especially through 
providing opportunities to participate in response 
efforts.  
General strategies: 
1) Address tendencies for denial head on. Correct 
interpretation of these tendencies can help 
educators and policymakers from confusing denial 
with lack of caring or political will.  
2) Create a set of realistic opportunities for 
participating in positive actions. This will 
contradict isolation, build community, create 
positive frames of reference that are needed to 
counter these psychological barriers to action. 
3) Rather than focusing overly on information, 
focus on what can and should be done. Convey a 
message that it is not too late, that action can be 
taken that will make a difference Making a 
difference can be highlighted BOTH in immediate 
economic terms (which are important as they 
appear more tangible) and climate impacts. 
4) Create an atmosphere for people to experience 
both positive emotions and a positive view of the 
self. This must include real opportunities for 
change.  
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Table 5 Policy Implications in light of Social and Cultural Barriers  
National Identity 
(high carbon footprints 
contradicts national pride) 
Develop other ways of appealing to national identity and national pride 
e.g. through emission reduction efforts 
Knowledge of the risks of the modern world disrupt the underlying 
sense of order. To some extent this is inevitable, but research shows 
that when faced openly such fears are less paralyzing.   
Risk Society 
“Disembeddeness:” Collapsing of time and space such that risks are 
perceived as remote and disconnected from daily life. Make these 
links explicit, see below. 
Norms of space: Provide information on how local events are 
connected to global phenomenon. 
Cultural Cognition Norms 
Norms of time: Discuss future climate scenarios for specific places at 
specific future dates so that they can be better visualized.  




Contradict fear by providing honest information, open discussion (e.g. 
acknowledgement of the risks) but also hopeful examples.  
Contradict helplessness through providing opportunities for effective 
engagement. 
Combat guilt by acknowledging the present and providing 
opportunities to engage in more responsible behavior.  
 
 
Table 6 Policy Implications in light of Political Economic Barriers  
1) Lack of information in news 
media 
While information per se is extremely important 
and increasing the availability of accurate 
scientific information must be a priority, more 
emphasis needs to be placed on the framing of 
information, see below. 
2) Discourses and framing in media 
3) Balance as bias in news media 
4) Climate Skeptic misinformation 
campaign 
5) Fossil fuel influence on policy 
discourse 
Develop explicit media information campaign 
parallel to the one executed so successfully by the 
American Petroleum Industry.  
 
Develop limits on the ability of the fossil fuel 
industry to influence policy debate. 
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In reality the public sphere is not the equal playing field that we might hope. And while it is in 
all of our best short and long term economic interest to respond to climate change, there are 
powerful interests (namely the coal, petroleum and auto industries) who stand to lose. Thus one 
of the most powerful barriers to our social change is the demonstrated ability of these groups to 
hijack the public process through public misinformation campaigns.  
Because the majority of people are already concerned about climate change and how to 
make a difference, individuals and communities CAN be mobilized for response, if negative 
psychological pitfalls are to be avoided. Here’s how: 
 
  Build on positive stories of success. 
 
  Encourage and integrate efforts at community, state and federal levels. 
 
  Create a sense of community by building on the knowledge that individuals are part of a 
larger committed and motivated citizenry.  
 
  Highlight the caring which IS present in order to build a sense of pride and community. 
 
  Provide specific opportunities to engage in realistic actions. For example, engage in local 
“Impact Assessments,” “Disaster Preparedness” and “Mitigation Planning.” The 
development of these may serve to make climate information “real,” bringing it close to 
home. These actions are predicted to reduce the gap between climate change information 
and daily life, decrease the sense of a double reality, and bring home the impacts in 
economic, infrastructural, and physical terms. Such plans will also serve the second 
strategy of providing hopeful action. 
 
  It is very important that suggestions be realistic in order to be deemed credible. They 
should highlight doable changes at the same time as they encourage significant action. In 
order to elicit a response, people must be given not only information, but something to 
do. Communities should be encouraged to think carefully about what actions COULD 
and MUST be undertaken on all scales, and engage in hopeful collective action. Honest 
conversation about how much reduction is needed, where it could come from, what the 
benefits will be of responding, and what the costs will be of not responding should be 
encouraged. The trouble with many proposals which are “doable” is that they are 
inadequate and may thus appear to be little more than a smokescreen for business as 
usual. Instead, highlight tangible, positive outcomes. For example, a number of studies 
have highlighted the ability to respond to climate change while achieving other social 
benefits (e.g. energy efficiency has economic benefits in the short and long term, 
independent of any climate benefits).  
  




Citizen Knowledge and Attitudes Regarding Climate Change 
 
Bostrom, Ann, M. Granger Morgan, Baruch Fischoff and Daniel Read 1994. “What Do People 
Know About Global Climate Change? I Mental Models” Risk Analysis 14(6): 959-970. 
 
The authors conduct three exploratory studies that employed “mental model 
interviews.” Results indicate widespread misinformation regarding climate 
change in the general public, including confusion between ozone hole and global 
climate change, and between weather and climate. Confusion regarding causes of 
climate change was also observed (“automobile use, heat and emissions from 
industrial processes, aerosol spray cans, and pollution in general were frequently 
perceived as primary causes of global warming”). When asked what could be 
done, respondents tended to focus on general pollution control rather than 
reductions of carbon dioxide emissions or energy consumption. The authors argue 
that this general public misunderstanding of climate science is part of the 
widespread failure of response.  
 
Bord, Richard, Ann Fisher and Robert O’Connor 1998. “Public Perceptions of Global Warming: 
United States and International Perspectives.” Climate Research 11 (1):75-84. 
 
The authors review international survey data on public knowledge, concern, 
perceived risk and willingness to pay regarding global warming. While the 
authors find “solid awareness of and support for general environmental goals” and 
some measure of awareness and concern regarding global warming, they also find 
a widespread poor understanding of climate change in the public around the 
world. Concern tends to be highest in Canada, most of Europe and South 
America. Although the public expresses considerable perceived threat from global 
warming, the threat is less so than for most other issues surveyed. In conclusion, 
they find that although global warming is an issue of concern worldwide, it is not 
a ‘front-burner’ issue. The also find a “limited willingness to sacrifice” in 
response to climate change. In conclusion, the authors note that “Our own data 
support but go beyond earlier data by implying that global warming is not a 
salient issue, and that people across the globe will support global climate change 
initiatives that do not levy unusual hardships; but they cannot be expected to 
voluntarily alter their lifestyles.” 
 
Bord, Richard, Robert E. O'Connor and Ann Fischer 2000. In what sense does the public need to 
understand global climate change? Public Understanding of Science, 9(3): 205-218. 
 
In a survey of 1,218 Americans, the key determinant of behavioral intentions to 
address global warming is a correct understanding of the causes of global  
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warming. Knowing what causes climate change, and what does not, is the most 
powerful predictor of both stated intentions to take voluntary actions and to vote 
on hypothetical referenda to enact new government policies to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Identifying bogus causes (e.g., insecticides) correlates with the 
belief that the globe will warm, but is only weakly related to voluntary actions 
and not at all related to support for government policies. General pro-
environmental beliefs and perceptions that global warming poses serious threats 
to society also help to explain behavioral intentions. The explanatory power of an 
air pollution framework is substantial in bivariate analyses, but has little 
explanatory power in multivariate analyses that include knowledge, risk 
perceptions, and general environmental beliefs. Translating public concern for 
global warming into effective action requires real knowledge. General 
environmental concern or concern for the negative effects of air pollution appear 
not to motivate people to support programs designed to control global warming. 
 
Brechin, Steven 2003. “Comparative Public Opinion and Knowledge on Global Climatic Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol: The U.S. versus the World?’ International Journal of Sociology 
and Social Policy 23(10): 106-134. 
 
Brechin compiles public opinion surveys on public understanding of climate 
change from 15 nations between 1991 and 2001. He finds that even as scientific 
consensus on climate science increases, knowledge regarding causes of climate 
change by the public is minimal. There is some evidence for increased public 
understanding regarding the causes of climate change over the decade from 1991 
to 2001, however citizens in all nations studied remain largely uniformed. In the 
2001 survey, citizens of Mexico knew the most about the causes of climate 
change, but even here only one quarter of respondents correctly identifying 
burning fossil fuels as the primary cause of global warming. Americans, who 
were tied with the citizens of Brazil at 15%, were in the middle of the pack. The 
article includes survey data collected shortly after President Bush's withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol in 1991 on attitudes regarding this event. The U.S. public 
is much more supportive of Bush’s withdrawl than were the citizens of European 
nations (where there was considerable outrage expressed). 
 
Brechin, Steven R 2008.  Ostriches and Change: A Response to 'Global Warming and Sociology' 
Current Sociology 56(3): 467-474. 
 
The threat of climate change should be more than sufficient to mobilize the world 
to respond meaningfully and quickly. However, Brechin considers reasons why 
this has not been the case, including the fact that response must be made to 
conditions not yet fully realized. Brechin claims  that most people  in the rich and 
powerful Northern countries do not really feel like they are living on the edge. 
Environmental concerns such as climate change are seen as “no more than 
background noise.” 
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Brewer, Thomas 2005 “U.S. Public Opinion on Climate Change Issues: Implications for 
Consensus building and Policymaking” Climate Policy, 4: 359-376. 
 
Brewer compiles and analyzes over 40 U.S. public opinion surveys from 1989 
through 2004. He concludes that a substantial majority want the government to 
take stronger steps on climate change and welcome U.S. participation in the 
Kyoto protocol, and do not support “key elements of the Bush administration 
policies.” Mandatory emissions reductions on industry and economic assistance to 
developing countries are both supported.  
 
Dunlap, Riley E. 1998. "Lay Perceptions of Global Risk: Public Views of Global Warming in 
Cross-National Context." International Sociology 13:473-498. 
 
Dunlap reports results from a 1992 Gallup survey conducted in Canada, the U.S., 
Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, and Russia on public perceptions of global warming. 
Most respondents saw global warming as a problem, although it was not generally 
ranked as serious as ozone depletion or rain forest destruction. Most respondents 
did not understand climate science well. In particular the study, as have others, 
found confusion between climate change and ozone depletion. Despite limitations 
in knowledge however, citizens in all nations except Russia believed that climate 
change would have consequences in their lifetimes. As predicted by the concept 
of a risk society suggest, public perceptions of global warming do not vary 
consistently across differing social strata within nations. Dunlap makes the 
important consideration, however, whether detailed public understanding of 
highly complex issues such as global warming is feasible or even necessary for 
effective policy making. 
 
Dunlap, Riley E.; Xiao, Chenyang McCright, Aaron 2001. Politics and Environment in America: 
Partisan and Ideological Cleavages in Public Support for Environmentalism Environmental 
Politics 10(4): 23-48. 
 
Surveys U.S. trends in concern and level of information regarding climate change. 
Notes especially a new and growing divide between perceptions of Democrats 
and Republicans. The authors note that historically support for environmental 
protection in the United States has been relatively nonpartisan, but that especially 
since 1994 a partisan divide has been noticeable, especially among members of 
Congress (who tend to be more ideologically polarized than the general public). 
Data from the League of Conservation Voters on voting scores indicated a chasm 
in both the House and Senate over the past decade.  Also, “nowhere is the partisan 
gap on environmental issues more apparent than on climate change.” Currently a 
very large gap exists between self-identified Republicans and Democrats in terms 
of perceptions of global warming. See below for more updated and detailed 
information on this trend.  
 
Dunlap, Riley and Aaron M. McCright. 2008. "A Widening Gap: Republican and Democratic  
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Views on Climate Change." Environment 50 (September/October): 26-35. 
 
This paper expands on the original essay (2001) grounding the analysis in 
literature on partisan polarization and adding updated correlation results to 
reinforce the evidence of growing polarization. The latest survey data demonstrate 
that the relationships between party identification and global warming views are 
not spurious, and that the polarization is stronger among respondents who believe 
they understand global warming. The percentage of Americans viewing global 
warming as a serious threat to themselves or their way of life during their 
lifetimes has moderately increased, from 25 percent in 1997 to 40 percent in 
2008. The percentage saying that global warming will pose a serious threat within 
their lifetimes has also increased moderately, although it is still a minority 
position at 40 percent (up from 25 percent in 1997). “What these overall trends 
generally mask, however, are highly divergent trends among Republicans and 
Democrats. As noted above, the proportions of Democrats agreeing that global 
warming is already happening, that most scientists believe it is occurring, and that 
it poses a serious threat have increased substantially over the past decade. In 
contrast, the proportion of Republicans agreeing that global warming is already 
happening has declined a bit, while the proportions agreeing that most scientists 
believe global warming is occurring and that it poses a serious threat have both 
increased only modestly. The proportion of Republicans who believe news of 
global warming’s seriousness is exaggerated has grown considerably over the past 
decade, while the proportion of Democrats expressing this view has declined. A 
similar pattern of diverging partisan views has also occurred on the issue of 
attributing global warming to human activities.” Dunlap and McCright suggest 
that this skepticism among Republican and conservative elites has led rank-and-
file Republicans in the electorate to follow suit. 
 
Krosnic, Jon, Allyson Holbrook, Laura Lowe and Penny Visser 2006 “The Origins and 
Consequences of Democratic Citizen’s Policy Agendas: A Study of Popular Concern about 
Global Warming” Climate Change 77:7-43. 
 
Stanford social psychologist Krosnic has a long history of work in this area. This 
paper contributes to work on the complexity of the relationship between efficacy 
and action regarding climate change. The authors evaluate both causes and 
consequences of Americans' judgments of the seriousness of global warming 
using data from two surveys. They find that judgments about global warming are 
a function of beliefs about the existence of global warming, attitudes toward it, 
the certainty with which these beliefs and attitudes are held. Judgments and 
beliefs about human responsibility for causing global warming, and people's 
ability to remedy it. They also find that beliefs about whether global warming is a 
problem are a function of relevant personal experiences (with the weather) and 
messages from informants (in this case, scientists), that attitudes toward global 
warming are a function of particular perceived consequences of global warming, 
and that certainty about these attitudes and beliefs is a function of knowledge and  
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prior thought. More specifically they observe that people stopped paying attention 
to global climate change when they realized that there is no easy solution for it. 
Instead they note that many people judged as serious only those problems for 
which they thought action could be taken.  
 
Krosnick, Jon, Allyson Holbrook and Penny Visser 2000 The Impact of the Fall 1997 Debate 
about Global Warming on American Public Opinion. Public Understanding of Science 9: 239-
260. 
 
Krosnik and co-authors examine the effect of the Clinton campaign to put global 
climate change into the spotlight during the fall of 1997 in order to build support 
for Kyoto. The authors examine (1) What were Americans' beliefs and attitudes 
about global warming before the debate? (2) Did the debate catch the public's 
attention? and (3) Did the debate change people's beliefs and attitudes about 
global warming? They observed that a majority of the American general public 
endorsed the views advocated by Clinton before the media campaign began. They 
conclude that “the debate did attract people's attention and strengthened the 
public's beliefs and attitudes,” but “produced almost no changes in public opinion 
when the nation's population is lumped together.” They do note differences 
between Republican and Democratic support for the President’s position on 
Kyoto (observations which are repeated in work by McCright and Dunlap as well 
as others in this bibliography). 
 
Nisbet, Matthew and Teresa Myers 2007. The Polls – Trends: Twenty Years of Public Opinion 
about Global Warming. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 71(3): 444–470. 
 
Nisbet and Myers conduct a systematic review of trends in public opinion 
regarding global warming. They summarize public opinion across several key 
dimensions including (a) public awareness of the issue of global warming; (b) 
public understanding of the causes of global warming and the specifics of the 
policy debate; (c) public perceptions of the certainty of the science and the level 
of agreement among experts; (d) public concern about the impacts of global 
warming; (e) public support for policy action in light of potential economic costs; 
and (f) public support for the Kyoto climate treaty. 
 
O'Connor Robert , Richard J. Bord , Brent Yarnal and Nancy Wiefek 2002. Who Wants to 
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions? Social Science Quarterly 83(1):1 – 17. 
 
The authors use a heuristic model approach to compare cognitive, economic, and 
partisan explanations for who supports reductions in climate emissions. Based on 
survey data from a mail survey of 623 residents in Pennsylvania, the authors find 
that people who can both accurately identify causes of climate change and who 
expect negative future climate scenarios are the most likely to support both 
government and voluntary actions. “Economic circumstances and anxieties are 
not important predictors, but the belief that environmental protection efforts do  
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not threaten jobs for people like the respondent, limit personal freedoms, and hurt 
the economy is a strong predictor.” Similar to later work by Dunlap and 
McCright, the authors find that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to 
support government efforts to reduce emissions. The authors conclude that so 
called “cognitive” explanations of support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
are more powerful than economic or partisan heuristic ones. “People want to 
reduce emissions if they understand the causes of climate change, if they perceive 
substantial risks from climate change, if average surface temperatures increase, 
and if they think climate change mitigation policies will not cost them their jobs.” 
Although not inherently so, the assumptions of this article place it in the 
information deficit camp of why people fail to respond, which is criticized by 
Norgaard and Buckeley.  
 
Sterman, John and Linda Booth Sweeney 2007 “Understanding public complacency about 
climate change: adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter” 
Climatic Change (2007) 80:213–238. 
 
Sterman and Sweeney 2007 note the paradox that most Americans believe climate 
change poses serious risks but also believe inaccurately that emissions reductions 
can be deferred until there is greater certainty surrounding climate science. “Such 
wait-and-see policies erroneously presume climate change can be reversed 
quickly should harm become evident, underestimating substantial delays in the 
climate’s response to anthropogenic forcing.” The conducted experimental work 
with graduate students at MIT which found that even these highly educated adults 
had “widespread misunderstanding” of how climate change worked, 
misunderstandings that caused them to systematically underestimate the need for 
immediate action to stabilize the climate. In particular, research subjects 
conceived of the global climate as a system which was analagous to a bathtub 
filling over, once the input stops the tub level can be lowered right away. 
However research shows once in the atmosphere, climate gases will continue to 
rise even if emissions fall. The authors write that, “these beliefs – analogous to 
arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow – support wait-
and-see policies but violate conservation of matter. Low public support for 
mitigation policies may arise from misconceptions of climate dynamics rather 
than high discount rates or uncertainty about the impact of climate change.” 





Armitage, Kevin 2005. State of Denial: The United States and the Politics of Global Warming 
Globalizations 2(3): 417–427. 
 
Similar to work by McCright and Dunlap, as well as Boykoff, Armitage addresses 
the unique ways that climate science has been politicized in the United States, and  
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the result in terms of public perception of uncertainty. The author outlines the role 
of right-wing politicians and think tanks in falsely depicting greenhouse science 
as uncertain, and the way that this has been portrayed in media. The author traces 
links between corporate media, fossil fuel industry and the federal government as 
arguments for the lack of political action against global warming in the United 
States. 
 
Dulap, Riley and Aaron McCright 2008 A Widening Gap: Republican and Democratic Views on 
Climate Change Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 
September/October. 
 
Jacques, Peter, Riley Dunlap and Mark Freeman 2008 The organisation of denial: Conservative 
think tanks and environmental skepticism Environmental Politics 17( 3): 349-385. 
 
The authors analyze 141 English-language environmentally skeptical books 
published between 1972 and 2005, linked to conservative think tanks (most also 
published in the United States. The authors also examine conservative think tanks  
involved with environmental issues, finding that 90 per cent espouse 
environmental skepticism. The authors highlight how environmental skepticism 
denies the seriousness of environmental problems, and examine the use of the 
label 'junk science'. They conclude that “skepticism is a tactic of an elite-driven 
counter-movement designed to combat environmentalism, and that the successful 
use of this tactic has contributed to the weakening of U.S. commitment to 
environmental protection.”   
 
 
McCright, Aaron M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2000. "Challenging Global Warming as a Social 
Problem: An Analysis of the Conservative Movement's Counter-Claims." Social Problems 
47:499-522. 
 
McCright and Dunlap examine the activities of the anti-environmental 
conservative movement in the United States as an explanation for the U.S. failure 
to ratify the Kyoto treaty. They examine conservative movement activities 
regarding climate change from 1990 to1997, describing how conservative think 
tanks challenged claims of climate science by aligning themselves with prominent 
American climate skeptics. McCright and Dunlap identify a relationship between 
these climate skeptic scientists and the fossil fuels industry. They conclude, “This 
study demonstrates how a powerful countermovement effectively challenged the 
environmental community's definition of global warming as a social problem and 
blocked the passage of any significant climate change policy.”  
 
—. 2003. "Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement's Impact on U.S. Climate Change 
Policy." Social Problems 50:348-373. 
 
McCright and Dunlap argue that a major reason the United States failed to ratify  
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the Kyoto Protocol was the opposition of the American conservative movement, a 
key segment of the antienvironmental countermovement. They examine 
movement mobilization from 1990 to1997, during which time the movement 
successfully constructed an argument regarding the non-problematicity of global 
warming. The authors also describe how conservative think tanks mobilized to 
challenge the claims of mainstream climate science, as well as how these 
countermovement organizations aligned themselves with prominent American 
climate change skeptics known for their staunch criticism of mainstream climate 
research, and their affiliations with the fossil fuels industry. The authors also 
examine how the efforts of these conservative think tanks were enhanced by the 
shift in the political opportunity structure created by the 1994 Republican 
takeover of Congress. The authors conclude, “This study demonstrates how a 
powerful countermovement effectively challenged the environmental 
community's definition of global warming as a social problem and blocked the 
passage of any significant climate change policy.” 
 
Apathy and Denial 
 
Brechin, Steven R. 2008. "Ostriches and Change: A Response to `Global Warming and 
Sociology'." Current Sociology 56:467-474. 
 
Brechin writes that despite the fact that climate change is the most serious 
environmental and social challenge of our time, for most people, especially 
citizens in the rich and powerful Northern nations who emit the highest levels of 
carbon dioxide, and where people are not living economically on the edge, 
environmental concerns have become background noise. 
 
Bulkeley, Harriet. 2000. "Common Knowledge? Public Understanding of Climate Change in 
Newcastle, Australia." Public Understanding of Science 9:313-333. 
 
Buckeley claims that public understanding of climate change not only involves 
knowledge of its physical processes, but also encompasses wider issues 
concerning the relation between society and nature. Based on her examination of 
the conclusions and assumptions of previous research on the public understanding 
of climate change, Buckeley argues that in each case, in accordance with the 
“information deficit model,” recorded levels of ignorance are seen as a barrier to 
effective public involvement in the policy process. However, she offers data from 
her work in Newcastle, Australia to show that whether and how people 
understand climate change is a function of both scientific information, and local 
knowledge, values, and moral responsibilities. Further, respondents connected the 
issue to their communities, and suggested that individual action is morally 
sanctioned, despite concerns for the efficacy of such action and the lack of 
government or industry support. She suggests that rather than focus on the 
provision of information, “policy attention should be directed to the social and 
institutional barriers that act to constrain public involvement in addressing global  
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environmental issues.” 
 
Cohen, Stanley States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering, Polity Press, 2001. 
 
Cohen provides in depth coverage of how people avoid uncomfortable situations 
on the personal level, as well as how personal avoidance is translated into political 
avoidance and vice versa. Using case studies from the Holocaust as well as other 
cases of genocides, torture and political massacre, Cohen examines the denial 
behaviors of  both perpetrators and bystanders, discussing the phenomena of the 
"passive bystander" and “compassion fatigue.” 
 
Immerwahr, John 1999. Waiting for a Signal: Public Attitudes toward Global Warming, the 
Environment and Geophysical Research. Public Agenda/ American Geophysical Union.  
 
One of the first studies to examine why there is an indirect link between a 
person’s knowledge of climate science and whether or not they take action (e.g. to 
go against the information deficit approach). Immerwahr conducts focus groups 
on climate change (and other issues) and concludes regarding climate change in 
particular that respondents, “seemed to have hit a wall.” Respondents did show 
deep concern regarding global warming, but their concern did not translate into 
action: “our research suggests that what the public is most skeptical about is not 
the existence of problems but our ability to solve them.” Thus, Immerwahr 
cautions that “informing the public of the problems can increase frustration and 
apathy rather than build support.” In order to promote action regarding climate 
change the author suggests not more information, but actions that can be taken. 
 
Kellstedt, Paul, Sammy Zahran and Arnold Vedlitz 2008.  Personal Efficacy, the Information 
Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States 
Risk Analysis 28( 1): 113-126. 
 
Authors use survey data to examine the role of information, confidence in 
scientists and personal efficacy in shaping respondent’s risk assessment regarding 
climate change. Their results strongly counter the information deficit approach. 
Specifically, they find that the degree of information a person has regarding 
climate change, their confidence in scientists and their personal efficacy regarding 
climate change interact so that the more informed respondents both feel less 
personally responsible for global warming and also show less concern. 
 
Krosnick, Jon, Allyson Holbrook, Laura Lowe and Penny Visser 2006 “The Origins and 
Consequences of Democratic Citizen’s Policy Agendas: A Study of Popular Concern about 
Global Warming” Climate Change 77:7-43. 
 
Stanford social psychologist Krosnic has a long history of work in this area. This 
paper contributes to work on the complexity of the relationship between efficacy 
and action regarding climate change. The authors evaluate both causes and  
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consequences of Americans' judgments of the seriousness of global warming 
using data from two surveys. They find that judgments about global warming are 
a function of beliefs about the existence of global warming, attitudes toward it, 
the certainty with which these beliefs and attitudes are held, and beliefs about 
human responsibility for causing global warming and people's ability to remedy 
it. They also find that beliefs about whether global warming is a problem are a 
function of relevant personal experiences (with the weather) and messages from 
informants (in this case, scientists), that attitudes toward global warming are a 
function of particular perceived consequences of global warming, and that 
certainty about these attitudes and beliefs is a function of knowledge and prior 
thought. More specifically they observe that people stopped paying attention to 
global climate change when they realize that there is no easy solution for it. 
Instead they note that many people judge as serious only those problems for 
which they think action can be taken.  
 
Sandvik, Hanno 2008 Public concern over global warming correlates negatively with national 
wealth Climatic Change 90(3): 333-341 
 
The author builds on work by Norgaard and others to assert that public awareness 
and concern regarding climate change is not a function of scientific information 
alone, but psychological and sociological factors as well. Sandvik examines data 
on public concern for climate change from 46 countries, with results pointing to a 
negative association between concern and national wealth (GDP) and carbon 
dioxide emissions and a “marginally significant” tendency that nations’ per capita 
carbon dioxide emissions are negatively correlated to public concern. Sandvik 
concludes that such a relationship is “in accordance with psychological findings, 
but poses a problem for political decision-makers.” 
 
Sterman, John and Linda Sweeney 2007 “Understanding Public Complacency About Climate 
Change: Adults Mental Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter” Climate 
Change 80: 213-238. 
 
Stoll-Kleemann, Tim O’Riordan and Carlo Jaeger “The Psychology of Denial Concerning 
Climate Mitigation Measures: Evidence from Swiss Focus Groups” Global Environmental 
Change 11: 107-117. 
 
 See  above 
 
Norgaard, Kari Marie. 2006a. "'People Want to Protect Themselves a Little Bit': Emotions, 
Denial, and Social Movement Nonparticipation." Sociological Inquiry 76:372-396. 
 
Emotions can be a source of information and an impetus for social action, but the 
desire to avoid unpleasant emotions and the need for emotion management can 
also prevent social movement participation. Ethnographic and interview data from 
a rural Norwegian community describes how people avoided thinking about  
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climate change in part because doing so raised fears of ontological security, 
emotions of helplessness and guilt, and was a threat to individual and collective 
senses of identity. In contrast to existing studies that focus on the public's lack of 
information or concern about global warming as the basis for the lack of public 
response, my work describes the way in which holding information at a distance 
was an active strategy performed by individuals as part of emotion management. 
Following Evitar Zerubavel, I describe this process of collective avoiding as the 
social organization of denial. Emotions played a key role in denial, providing 
much of the reason why people preferred to avoid information. Emotion 
management was also a central aspect of the process of denial, which in this 
community was carried out through the use of a cultural stock of social narratives 
that were invoked to achieve "perspectival selectivity" and "selective 
interpretation.". 
 
Norgaard, Kari. 2006b. “We Don’t Really Want to Know’ The Social Experience of Global 
Warming: Dimensions of Denial and Environmental Justice” Organization and Environment 
19(3): 347-470. 
 
Meager public response in the form of social movement activity, behavioral 
changes, or public pressure on governments is noteworthy in all Western nations. 
Existing research emphasizes lack of information as a limiting factor for failed 
public response. This explanation cannot account for the significant population 
that knows about and express concernes for global warming. Ethnographic and 
interview data from a rural Norwegian community indicate that non-response is at 
least partially a matter of socially organized denial. Because Norwegian economic 
prosperity is tied to oil production, collectively ignoring climate change maintains 
Norwegian economic interests. Most environmental justice research focuses on 
people facing disproportionate exposure to environmental problems. This project 
examines wealthy citizens who perpetuate global warming as they turn a blind 
eye. Environmental justice implications of socially organized denial are discussed 
for global warming and beyond. 
 
Opotow, Susan and Leah Weiss 2000. “New Ways of Thinking About Environmentalism: Denial 
and the Process of Moral Exclusion in Environmental Conflict” Journal of Social Issues 56, 3, 
475-490. 
 
The authors examine “moral orientations” that influence environmental conflict. 
Opotow and Weiss create a typology of three kinds of denial in environmental 
conflict: denial of outcome severity, denial of stakeholder inclusion, and denial of 
self-involvement. Opotow and Weiss describe how these forms of denial work 
together to produce “moral exclusion.” The article concludes with implications of 
this analysis for theory and practice. 
 
Ungar, Sheldon 2003. “Misplaced Metaphor: A Critical Analysis of the ‘Knowledge Society’” 
Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 40(3): 331-347.  
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Ungar rejects the conception of a “knowledge society” metaphor, arguing instead 
that we live in a “knowledge averse” culture. The author examines the idea of the 
well-informed citizen, the notion that our present society contains institutional 
arrangements and social expectations for being knowledgeable, and the role of the 
Internet in providing critical underpinnings of a “knowledge society.”Ungar 
argues that while social processes create a high degree of knowledge 
specialization in the workplace, this very phenomenon may  increase ignorance 
across society in general.  
 
Zerubavel, Evitar. Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology, Harvard University 
Press, 1997. 
 
For Zerubavel, we think not as individuals but as members of social groups. 
Therefore we must be aware of the ways that society shapes our sense of memory, 
what we pay attention to, what we ignore, and every aspect of cognition.  
 
Zerubavel,  Evitar. The Elephant in the Room: Silence and Denial in Everyday Life New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Wide ranging and persuasive analysis of the social organization of denial. 
Zerubavel notes that denial normally studied on the psychological level, but it is 
our society that tells us what to pay attention to and what to ignore, what to worry 
about and what is acceptable. Therefore we must study denial with a sociological 
lens. Numerous examples on this topic. 
 
Emotions and Identity 
 
Leiserowitz, Anthony 2007 “Communicating the risks of global warming: American risk 
perceptions, affective images and interpretive communities” in Moser, Susanne C. and Lisa 
Dilling. eds Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating 
Social Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Even though a large majority of Americans believe global warming is occurring 
and is a serious problem, there lacks a sense of urgency and remains a low priority 
relative to other national and environmental issues. The author examines the risk 
perceptions and connotative meanings of global warming in the American mind, 
finding that Americans perceive climate change as “a moderate risk that will 
predominantly impact geographically and temporally distant people and places.” 
Leiserowitz identifies distinct interpretive communities (segments of the public 
that conceptualize and respond to the issue in very different ways) and provides 
strategies to communicate about global warming that either resonate with the 
values and predispositions of particular audiences, or that directly challenge 
fundamental misconceptions.   
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Lorenzoni, Irene, Leiserowitz, Anthony, De Franca Doria, Migue, Poortinga, Wouter and Nick 
Pidgeon. 2006. “Cross-National Comparisons of Image Associations with “Global Warming” 
and “Climate Change” Among Laypeople in the United States of America and Great Britain” 
Journal of Risk Research 9: (3):265-281. 
 
“Affect” is considered by social psychologists to be the positive or negative 
evaluation of an object, idea, or image. Similar to emotions, but not as “full 
blown”, affect has been shown to  powerfully influence both information 
processing and decision-making. This paper in the area of risk perception and 
affect in the United States and Great Britain found that, “the terms “global 
warming” and “climate change”, and their associated images, evoked negative 
affective responses from most respondents. Personally relevant impacts, causes, 
and solutions to climate change, were rarely mentioned, indicating that climate 
change is psychologically distant for most individuals in both nations.” The 
authors also note that “personally relevant impacts, causes, and solutions to 
climate change, were rarely mentioned, indicating that climate change is 
psychologically distant for most individuals in both nations.” 
 
 
Meijnders, Anneloes Cees Midden and Henk Wilke 2001 “Role of Negative Emotions in 
Communication about CO2 Risks” Risk Analysis 21(5): 955-966. 
 
The authors use an experiment regarding the risks of carbon dioxide emissions to 
support their claim that both emotion and information are factors influencing 
effective risk communication. In the experiment, inducing fear of carbon dioxide 
risks leads participants to more effectively process information about energy 
conservation, which in turn results in more favorable attitudes toward energy 
conservation. “Exposure to strong arguments resulted in more positive attitudes 
towards the energy-efficient light bulb than exposure to weak arguments in the 
moderate fear condition.” This positive role of the emotion of fear in information 
processing may be counter to ethnographic and interview work by Norgaard and 
work from focus groups by Immerwahr, although the latter focus on negative 
emotions as barriers to action, not barriers to information processing per se. The 
authors note that extreme fear can reduce information processing effectiveness, 
but do not characterize climate change in the realm of extreme fear as the impacts 
are in the future (a questionable assumption).  
 
Meijndes Anneloes, Cees Midden and Henk Wilke. 2001. “Communications ‘About 
Environmental Risks and Risk-Reducing Behavior: The Impact of Fear on Information 
Processing” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 31(4): 754-777. 
 
Similar to the companion piece, this article addresses the role of emotions 
(specifically fear) in how people respond to information. Authors set up an 
experiment through which the emotions of fear and the strength of arguments  
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regarding the seriousness of climate change were varied. Next participants were 
exposed to a message about energy efficient light bulbs. Participants in the groups 
with higher levels of fear did a better job processing information about the light 
bulbs. “The results indicate that both moderate and high levels of fear had an 
impact on attitudes. Moderate fear resulted in more positive attitudes toward 
energy-saving bulbs, but only when strong arguments in favor of these bulbs were 
provided. High fear had a positive effect on attitudes, regardless of argument 
strength.” The authors conclude that fear regarding future climate scenarios may 
influence attitudes towards energy conservation both directly and indirectly.  
 
Moser, Susanne, 2007 “More bad news: the risk of neglecting emotional responses to climate 
change information”in Moser, Susanne C. and Lisa Dilling. eds Creating a Climate for Change: 
Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Norgaard, Kari Marie. 2006. "'People Want to Protect Themselves a Little Bit': Emotions, 
Denial, and Social Movement Nonparticipation." Sociological Inquiry 76:372-396. 
 
Emotions can be a source of information and an impetus for social action, but the 
desire to avoid unpleasant emotions and the need for emotion management can 
also prevent social movement participation. Ethnographic and interview data from 
a rural Norwegian community describes how people avoided thinking about 
climate change in part because doing so raised fears of ontological security, 
emotions of helplessness and guilt, and was a threat to individual and collective 
senses of identity. In contrast to existing studies that focus on the public's lack of 
information or concern about global warming as the basis for the lack of public 
response, my work describes the way in which holding information at a distance 
was an active strategy performed by individuals as part of emotion management. 
Following Evitar Zerubavel, I describe this process of collective avoiding as the 
social organization of denial. Emotions played a key role in denial, providing 
much of the reason why people preferred to avoid information. Emotion 
management was also a central aspect of the process of denial, which in this 
community was carried out through the use of a cultural stock of social narratives 
that were invoked to achieve "perspectival selectivity" and "selective 
interpretation.". 
 
Stern, Paul. 1992. “Psychological Dimensions of Global Environmental Change” Annual Review 
of Psychology 43: 269-302. 
 
In this early piece on the topic, Paul Stern reviews existing knowledge from the 
field of psychology regarding global change mitigation, and adaptation. Stern also 
identifies a research agenda with emphasis on environmental attitudes, the 
determinants of specific human activities such as energy use, conservation and 
participation in the environmental movement and the ways people may perceive, 
respond to, or be affected by global environmental changes.   




Jacques, Peter 2006 The Rearguard of Modernity: Environmental Skepticism as a Struggle of 
Citizenship Global Environmental Politics 6:1. 
 
 See  above. 
 
Moser, Susanne C. and Lisa Dilling. 2007. Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating 
Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
This edited volume tackles climate change communication and social change, see 
more detail under specific entries.  
 
Norgaard, Kari Marie. 2006. "'People Want to Protect Themselves a Little Bit': Emotions, 
Denial, and Social Movement Nonparticipation." Sociological Inquiry 76:372-396. 
 
 
Emotions can be a source of information and an impetus for social action, but the 
desire to avoid unpleasant emotions and the need for emotion management can 
also prevent social movement participation. Ethnographic and interview data from 
a rural Norwegian community describes how people avoided thinking about 
climate change in part because doing so raised fears of ontological security, 
emotions of helplessness and guilt, and was a threat to individual and collective 
senses of identity. In contrast to existing studies that focus on the public's lack of 
information or concern about global warming as the basis for the lack of public 
response, my work describes the way in which holding information at a distance 
was an active strategy performed by individuals as part of emotion management. 
Following Evitar Zerubavel, I describe this process of collective avoiding as the 
social organization of denial. Emotions played a key role in denial, providing 
much of the reason why people preferred to avoid information. Emotion 
management was also a central aspect of the process of denial, which in this 
community was carried out through the use of a cultural stock of social narratives 




Bell, Alan. 1994. “Climate of Opinion: Public and Media Discourse on the Global 
Environment,” Discourse and Society. 5(1): 33-64. 
 
Bell compares the public discourse on climate change in New Zealand with media 
coverage in the preceding year. The author identifies “considerable mismatch” 
between media reporting of climate science and public understanding. In general 
the Bell finds that the public knows little about causes of climate change. 
Confusion in the public is characterized by overestimates of temperature and sea  
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level rise scenarios and confusion between the greenhouse effect and ozone 
depletion. Bell concludes that, “this misunderstanding is socially and politically 
disabling because it misleads people away from dealing with an issue at the heart 
of western consumer society—the consumption of fossil fuels.” 
 
Jacques, Peter 2006. “ The Rearguard of Modernity: Environmental Skepticism as a Struggle of 
Citizenship” Global Environmental Politics. 6(1): 76-101. 
 
 See  above. 
 
Ungar, Sheldon 2003. “Misplaced Metaphor: A Critical Analysis of the ‘Knowledge Society’” 
Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 40(3): 331-347. 
 
Ungar rejects the conception of a “knowledge society” metaphor, arguing instead 
that we live in a “knowledge averse” culture. The author examines the idea of the 
well-informed citizen, the notions that our present society contains institutional 
arrangements and social expectations for being knowledgeable, and the role of the 
Internet in providing critical underpinnings of a “knowledge society.”Ungar 
argues that while social processes create a high degree of knowledge 
specialization in the workplace, this very phenomenon may  increase ignorance 
across society in general.  
 
Ungar, Sheldon 2007 “Public scares: changing the issue culture” in Moser, Susanne C. and Lisa 
Dilling. eds Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating 
Social Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ungar, Sheldon 2008. “Ignorance as an under-identified social problem. British Journal of 
Sociology, 59(2): 301-326. 
 
Similar to earlier paper on the misplaced metaphor of a knowledge society, Ungar 
examines “the persistence of ignorance in the ostensible knowledge society.” 
Ungar identifies contradictory dynamics of the knowledge society, specifically 
information explosions in the knowledge economy and the resultant “knowledge-
ignorance paradox.” Ungar counters that “pockets of observed public knowledge - 
rather than ignorance - are exceptional and require specific explanation.” While 
ignorance among individuals, as well as experts and organizations, is a serious 
social problem with potentially deadly consequences, ignorance remains 
relatively unrecognized since it has major liabilities as a marketable issue. Ungar 
argues that we are in need of more research on “the cultural and institutional 





Boykoff, Maxwell T. and Jules M. Boykoff. 2004. "Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the  
  64 
US Prestige Press." Global Environmental Change Part A 14:125-136. 
 
The authors conduct a content analysis of coverage of global warming from 1988 
to 2002 in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, 
and the Wall Street Journal. Similar to other articles by Maxwell Boykoff, the 
authors describe how the press's adherence to “balance” produces “biased” 
coverage of both anthropogenic contributions to global warming by amplifying 
the perception of uncertainty in climate science in the public mind. The authors 
describe how this “significant divergence of popular discourse from scientific 
discourse” is the result of tactical media responses and practices guided by widely 
accepted journalistic norms.  
 
Boykoff, Maxwell 2008 “The Cultural Politics of Climate Change Discourse in UK Tabloids” 
Political Geography 27: 549-569. 
 
Boykoff examines cultural issues of identity and discourse through claims and 
frames on climate change in four daily ‘working class’ tabloid newspapers in 
U.K.: The Sun (and News of the World), Daily Mail (and Mail on Sunday), the 
Daily Express (and Sunday Express), and the Mirror (and Sunday Mirror). Data 
show that news articles on climate change were predominantly framed through 
weather events, charismatic megafauna and the movements of political actors and 
rhetoric, while few stories focused on climate justice and risk. Headlines with 
tones of fear, misery and doom were most prevalent.  
 
Boykoff, Maxwell 2008 Lost in Translation? The United States television news coverage of 
anthropogenic climate change 1995-2004 Climate Change 86 1-11. 
 
The author illustrates the significant difference between this television coverage 
and scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change from 1996 
through 2004. Boykoff does this by conducing a content analysis of televison 
news coverage of climate change in United States network television news (ABC 
World,  News Tonight, CBS Evening News and NBC Nightly News) and  cable 
news (CNN WorldView, CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports and CNN NewsNight)  from 
1995 through 2004. Results show that 70% of U.S. television news segments have 
provided ‘balanced’ coverage regarding anthropogenic contributions to climate 
change. Boykoff concludes that as a result of the journalistic norm of balanced 
reporting, United States television news coverage has “perpetrated an 
informational bias by significantly diverging from the consensus view in climate 
science that humans contribute to climate change.”  As a result, the scientific 
consensus regarding climate change is not translated to the public, instead the 
media has produced an appearance of uncertainty and debate. This perception of 
uncertainty has then moved from the media into both public and policy discourse. 
 
Boykoff, Maxwell “Flogging a dead norm? Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic climate 
change in the United States and United Kingdom from 2003 to 2006” Area 39(4):  470-481.  
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Boykoff describes a journalistic norm of ‘balanced’ reporting in which writers 
give roughly equal coverage to both sides in any significant dispute. Boykoff 
describes how this norm incorrectly leads to the perception of greater uncertainty 
in climate debates in the public mind than in the scientific community, or a 
“divergence” in understanding regarding climate change between the scientists 
and the public. The author then compares the prevalence of “balanced” reporting 
in newspaper coverage of climate change in the United States and United 
Kingdom. The sample in time period from 2003 and 2006 shows a significant 
“divergence” from scientific consensus in the US in 2003–4, but no major 
“divergence” in UK reporting. Boykoff speculates that his findings “inform 
ongoing considerations about the spatially-differentiated media terms and 
conditions through which current and future climate policy is negotiated and 
implemented.” 
 
Boykoff, Maxwell 2007. “From convergence to contention: United States mass media 
representations of anthropogenic climate change science” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 32:  477–489. 
              Ltd 
 
Similar to the framework of his other articles, but here Boykoff compares the 
prevalence of “balanced” reporting in newspaper coverage of climate change in 
the United States and United Kingdom. The sample in time period from 2003 and 
2006 shows a significant “divergence” from scientific consensus in the US in 
2003–4, but no major “divergence” in UK reporting. Boykoff speculates that his 
findings “inform ongoing considerations about the spatially-differentiated media 
terms and conditions through which current and future climate policy is 
negotiated and implemented.” 
 
Brossard, Dominique; Shanahan, James; McComas, Katherine 2004. “Are Issue-Cycles 
Culturally Constructed? A Comparison of French and American Coverage of Global Climate 
Change” Mass Communication and Society 7(3):359-377. 
 
The authors conduct a comparison of newspaper coverage of climate change in 
France and in the US (1987-1997) as a case study to analyze the impact of 
culturally bound journalistic practices on media attention cycles. They find that 
France's coverage was more event-based, focused more on international relations, 
and presented a more restricted range of viewpoints on global warming than 
American coverage did. American coverage emphasized conflicts between 
scientists & politicians. Downs's "media-attention cycle," which is apparent for 
the American coverage, does not manifest as visibly in French coverage. They 
suggest that research on media coverage of global environmental issues needs to 
move beyond studies at the national level; cross-cultural comparisons are essential 
to understand how different news regimes might affect public opinion 
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Carvalho, Anabela 2007. “Communicating global responsibility? Discourses on climate change 
and citizenship” International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics  3( 2):180-183. 
 
Carvalho describes two “background” ways that news media contribute to the 
normalization of climate change. On the one hand, “the media is a culprit that 
instigates materialism by constantly promoting wealth and consumption while 
acting almost in collusion with the main forces that foment global warming for 
sake of advertising revenue.” Furthermore, Carvalho observes that mainstream 
media provides news mainly from the Northern hemisphere, Western Europe and 
American-based news. As a result, it steers the gaze of viewers away from parts 
of the world where climate impacts may be most visible.   
 
 
Carvalho, Anabela 2005. “Representing the Politics of the Greenhouse Effect: Discursive 
Strategies in the British Media” Critical Discourse Studies  2(1): 1-29. 
 
The author uses cricitcal discourse analysis to to identify the discursive strategies 
of political actors and the media in their re-constructions of climate change. The 
author compares representations of climate change in three British newspapers -- 
The Guardian, The Independent, and The Times. 
 
Dunwoody; Sharon 2007 “The challenge of trying to make a difference using media messages” 
in Moser, Susanne C. and Lisa Dilling. eds Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating 
Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mazur, Allan 1998. Global Environmental Change in the News: 1987-90 vs 1992-6 International 
Sociology, 13 (4): 457-472. 
 
Early work on media coverage of climate change by Alan Mazur (1998) indicates 
that global environmental hazards including climate change and other issues were 
both present in the US media in the late 1980s up until 1990, after which point it 
declined, even though scientific consensus increased during that time and the 
Clinton White House was sympathetic to environmental concerns from 1992 until 
2000. Mazur also hypothesizes that attention to climate change spread from the 
US media to media coverage in other nations. 
 
Sonnett, John H. 2006 “Representing the Earth: Global climate issues in popular, political, 
scientific, business, industry, and environmentalist news: A new old sociology of knowledge” 
Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 67(02): 743. 
 
John Sonnett (2006)  notes differences in language representation between 
scientific community, news media and the oil industry: scientists speak of 
“climate change,” the news media of “global warming,” and the oil industry of 
“greenhouse gases.” He observes that each term is “embedded within risk 
discourses, structured primarily by scientific uncertainties and political fears.”  
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Weiskel, Timothy 2005. “From Sidekick to Sideshow -- Celebrity, Entertainment, and the 
Politics of Distraction: Why Americans Are "Sleepwalking Toward the End of the Earth" 
American Behavioral Scientist 49(3): 393-409. 
 
Timothy Weiskel describes a “politics of distraction” in the US media which he 
argues accounts for at least part of why the public fails to respond to climate 
change. Weiskel describes the movement of celebrities into the White House as 




Dispensa, Jaclyn Marissa and Robert J. Brulle 2003. “Media’s Social Construction of 
Environmental Issues: Focus on Global Warming – A Comparative Study” International Journal 
of Sociology and Social Policy. 23(10): 74-105.  
 
In order to address whether the US media present a biased view of global 
warming, the authors examine media coverage of global warming from a content 
analysis of three countries' newspaper articles and  two international scientific 
journals in 2000. They compare media presentations in the United States, New 
Zealand and Finland with the country’s economy, industry and environment. 
Dispensa and Brulle conclude that in the US  the fossil fuel industry has a 
significant impact on the media coverage of global warming in comparison to 
New Zealand & Finland where it does not. US media portray global warming as 
controversial whereas media portrayals in Finland and New are on par with 
presentations commonly found in the international scientific journals. 
 
Jacques, Peter, Riley Dunlap and Mark Freeman 2008 “The organisation of denial: Conservative 
think tanks and environmental skepticism” Environmental Politics 17( 3): 349-385 
 
The authors conduct a quantitative analysis of 141 English-language 
environmentally skeptical books published from 1972 to 2005. They find that 
over 92 percent of these texts are associated with conservative think tanks. The 
authors also examine those conservative think tanks who produce information on 
the environment, finding  90 per cent of such think tanks espouse environmental 
skepticism. The authors describe skepticism as a tactic of an elite-driven counter-
movement that is designed to combat environmentalism. They further claim that 
the successful production of skepticism regarding scientific certainty has 
contributed to the weakening of U.S. commitment to environmental protection at 
the political level. 
 
Michaels, David and Celeste Monforton 2005. “Manufacturing Uncertainty: Contested Science 
and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment” American Journal of Public Health 
95(S1): S39-S48. 
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The authors provide a historical view into the process of "manufacture 
uncertainty" in the United States by opponents of public health and environmental 
regulations. This process is carried out as industries question the validity of 
scientific evidence on which the regulations are based. They highlight that the 
industry strategy of manufacturing uncertainty is in opposition to the public health 
model, under which decisions should be made using the best available evidence in 
order to ensure the protection of the public’s health and the environment. 
Michaels and Monforton provide historical data from the tobacco and other 
industries and document the rise of the label "junk science" to de-legitimize  




Freudenburg, William, Robert Gramling and Debra J. Davidson 2008. “Scientific Certainty 
Argumentation Methods (SCAMs): Science and the Politics of Doubt” Sociological Inquiry 
78(1):2–38. 
 
Science provides falsification, but not “proof.” The authors trace the increasing 
call for scientific certainty, or “proof”in public discourse before policies can be 
implemented. Given that all science contains a measure of uncertainty, if agencies 
can be prevented from imposing any regulations until they are unambiguously 
“justified,” most regulations can be defeated or postponed, often for decades. This 
practice has allowed  profitable but potentially risky activities to continue 
unabated. Based on their review of previously documented controversies, the 
authors suggest that  “such calls may reflect not just a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of science, but a clever and surprisingly effective 
political-economic tactic—“Scientific Certainty” Argumentation Methods, or 
SCAMs.” They further suggest that such SCAMs are both more widespread than 
has been previously recongnized and should be the focus of more attention in the 
future.  
 
Grotzer, Tina and Rebecca Lincoln 2007.“Educating for ‘intelligent environmental action’ in an 
age of global warming”in Moser, Susanne C. and Lisa Dilling. eds Creating a Climate for 
Change: Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Meijnders, Anneloes Cees Midden and Henk Wilke 2001 “Role of Negative Emotions in 
Communication about CO2 Risks” Risk Analysis 21(5): 955-966. 
 
The authors use an experiment regarding the risks of carbon dioxide emissions to 
support their claim that both emotion and information are factors influencing 
effective risk communication. In the experiment, inducing fear of carbon dioxide 
risks leads participants to more effectively process information about energy 
conservation, which in turn results in more favorable attitudes toward energy 
conservation. “Exposure to strong arguments resulted in more positive attitudes  
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towards the energy-efficient light bulb than exposure to weak arguments in the 
moderate fear condition.” This positive role of the emotion of fear in information 
processing may be counter to ethnographic and interview work by Norgaard and 
work from focus groups by Immerwahr, although the latter focus on negative 
emotions as barriers to action, not barriers to information processing per se. The 
authors note that extreme fear can reduce information processing effectiveness, 
but do not characterize climate change in the realm of extreme fear as the impacts 
are in the future (a questionable assumption).  
 
 
Sturgis, Patrick and Nick Allum 2004 Science in society: re-evaluating the deficit model of 
public attitudes Public Understanding of Science. 13: 55–74. 
 
Within literature on public perception of science, the “deficit model” holds that 
public understanding of science is a determinant of public attitudes towards 
science. The authors’ research does support the dominant model that  knowledge 
is a determinant of attitudes toward science. However, the authors provide 
evidence that this relationship between knowledge and attitudes is more complex 




Brewer, Thomas 2005 “U.S. Public Opinion on Climate Change Issues: Implications for 
Consensus building and Policymaking” Climate Policy, 4: 359-376. 
 
Brewer compiles and analyzes over 40 US public opinion surveys from 1989 
through 2004. He concludes that a substantial majority want the government to 
take stronger steps on climate change, welcome US participation in the Kyoto 
protocol, and do not support “key elements of the Bush administration policies.” 
Mandatory emissions reductions on industry and economic assistance to 
developing countries are both supported.  
 
Bulkeley, Harriet. 2000. "Common Knowledge? Public Understanding of Climate Change in 
Newcastle, Australia." Public Understanding of Science 9:313-333. 
 
Buckeley claims that public understanding of climate change not only involves 
knowledge of its physical processes, but also encompasses wider issues 
concerning the relation between society and nature. Based on her examination of 
the conclusions and assumptions of previous research on the public understanding 
of climate change, Buckeley argues that in each case, in accordance with the 
“information deficit model,” recorded levels of ignorance are seen as a barrier to 
effective public involvement in the policy process. However, she offers data from 
her work in Newcastle, Australia to show that whether and how people 
understand climate change is a function of scientific information,  local 
knowledge, values, and moral responsibilities. Further, respondents connected the  
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issue to their communities, and suggested that individual action is morally 
sanctioned, despite concerns for the efficacy of such action and the lack of 
government or industry support. She suggests that rather than focus on the 
provision of information, “policy attention should be directed to the social and 
institutional barriers that act to constrain public involvement in addressing global 
environmental issues.” 
 
Dunlap, Riley E. 1998. "Lay Perceptions of Global Risk: Public Views of Global Warming in 
Cross-National Context." International Sociology 13:473-498. 
 
Dunlap reports results from a 1992 Gallup survey conducted in Canada, the U.S., 
Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, and Russia on public perceptions of global warming. 
Most respondents saw global warming as a problem, although it was not generally 
ranked as serious as ozone depletion or rain forest destruction. Most respondents 
did not understand climate science well. In particular the study, along with  
others, found confusion between climate change and ozone depletion. Despite 
limitations in knowledge, however, citizens in all nations except Russia believed 
that climate change would have consequences in their lifetimes. As predicted by 
the concept of a risk society, public perceptions of global warming do not vary 
consistently across differing social strata within nations. Dunlap makes the 
important consideration, however, of whether detailed public understanding of 
highly complex issues such as global warming is feasible or even necessary for 
effective policy making. 
 
Freudenburg, William, Robert Gramling and Debra J. Davidson 2008. “Scientific Certainty 
Argumentation Methods (SCAMs): Science and the Politics of Doubt” Sociological Inquiry 
78(1):2–38. 
 
Science provides falsification, but not “proof.” The authors trace the increasing 
call for scientific certainty, or “proof”in public discourse before policies can be 
implemented. Given that all science contains a measure of uncertainty, if agencies 
can be prevented from imposing any regulations until they are unambiguously 
“justified,” most regulations can be defeated or postponed, often for decades. This 
practice has allowed  profitable but potentially risky activities to continue 
unabated. Based on their review of previously documented controversies, the 
authors suggest that  “such calls may reflect not just a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of science, but a clever and surprisingly effective 
political-economic tactic—“Scientific Certainty” Argumentation Methods, or 
SCAMs.” They further suggest that such SCAMs are both more widespread than 
has been previously recongnized and should be the focus of more attention in the 
future.  
 
Grundmann, Reiner 2006. “Ozone and Climate: Scientific Consensus and Leadership” Science, 
Technology, and Human Values 31(1): 73-101. 
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Grundmann compares the relationship between scientific certainty and policy 
prescriptions in cases of ozone layer protection and climate change. Although 
scientific expertise is obviously a requirement for policy development in either 
case, strong international and highly successful policies to combat ozone 
depletion were agreed upon under conditions of far less scientific certainty than 
currently exists for climate change. Despite the greater scientific consensus, 
climate policies have been far more modest. Grundmann’s analysis of media 
discourse in the two cases indicates that both a high level of expectation of 
negotiators and pressure from leading nations are crucial variables for 
successfully negotiating strong policies.  
 
Grundmann, Reinar 2007. “Climate Change and Knowledge Politics” Environmental Politics 
16(3): 414-432. 
 
Grundmann notes that although the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
has reached a broad consensus, nations around the world pursue different, if not 
opposing policies, a fact which he believes challenges the traditional belief that 
scientific knowledge is objective and can be more or less directly translated into 
political action. The author compares the use of science in media and policy 
between the United States and Germany, finding that media in each country rely 
on different sources of scientific expertise when reporting on global warming. 
Furthermore, the US and German governments each use these different sources 
for legitimising their contrasting policies. Grundmann calls for a better 
understanding of the relation between science and public policy in modern 
society.  
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